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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: LABOR AND THE LOGIC OF EMPIRE
Frederick Jackson Turner, a pioneer among American historians and perhaps the
first great historian of American pioneers, is today most well known for his so-called
"frontier thesis." The fact that Turner first presented "The Significance of the Frontier in
American History" in 1893 at the World Columbian Exposition in Chicago should not be
lost to historians of empire, for it was most fitting for Turner to theorize about the
meaning of American expansion across the North American continent at an event
celebrating Christopher Columbus, the founding father of Spain's New World empire. 1 In
arguing that westward expansion defined the fundamental contours of American history
and enabled the peculiar democracy of the United States to thrive. Turner reminds us
today that history is not merely the study of change in human societies over time; it is
also necessarily the study of those societies and the spaces they occupy over time. Turner
called upon historians to advance beyond political institutions and political systems to
study the ways in which humans have constructed these institutions and systems in real
space, and whether these political systems either expanded, contracted, disappeared, or
maintained a sort of spatial stasis over time, and for what reasons.
It is therefore important to note Turner's observations seventeen years later. In
1910, Turner observed that the exhaustion of the frontier in the 1890s had been followed
by unprecedented immigration, extraordinary productivity and profits in the rail, iron,
steel and coal industries, and tremendous concentrations of capital in gigantic
1
John Mack Faragher, ed.. Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: -The Significance of the Frontier in
American History " and Other Essays (New Haven, 1 998), 1
.
1
corporations. But Turner also suggested that America's recent acquisition of Hawaii and
the Philippines, and the nation's entry into competition with the empires of Europe, was
"in some respects the logical outcome of the nation's march to the Pacific.
. .the sequence
to the era in which it was engaged in occupying the free lands and exploiting the
resources of the West." Turner saw industrial capitalism and overseas expansion as
important "social forces" in recent American history, but he did not explore what this
meant for the multitudes of Americans with little immediate material interest in an
American empire that no longer offered direct access to land or resources. In stressing the
historical continuity of empire in the United States between the twentieth century and its
preceding eras, and in largely leaving workers and labor out of the history of American
empire, Turner established the frameworks for a historical interpretation of American
expansion that persists in scholarship to this day.
Although "the labor question"-the question of who does (or does not do) the work
of a society, for whom and under what conditions-has always been integral to the long
history of empire, contemporary students of empire give it little attention. Highly
influenced by the rise of post-structuralist philosophy, literary criticism, the ascendancy
of cultural studies, and the transference of political legitimacy during the Cold War from
the West to the so-called "Third World," recent historical narratives of Western empires
represent a shift in historians' analyses of empire from issues of economics and politics to
problems of cultural power.
3
While this paradigmatic revolution has expanded our
2
Frederick Jackson Turner, "Social Forces in American History," in Faragher, ed., Rereading Frederick
Jackson Turner, 123.
3
Indeed, one refreshing but rather lonely intervention in recent histories of empire that focuses on issues of
work and labor does not even include "class" in its subtitle; see Gilbert G. Gonzalez, et. al„ cds.. Labor
Versus Empire: Race, Gender, and Migration (New York, 2004).
2
understanding of the manifold operations and meanings of empire throughout history, it
has also tended to obscure previous investigations of modern empire as a phenomenon
inextricably related to the rise of the nation-state, new structures of international trade
and finance, and the development of global capitalism and political economy in capitalist
societies.
This is so partly because the influence of the new '"cultural" historiography of
empire waxed while the analytical appeal of orthodox Marxism waned. A growing
disillusionment with Marxism and historical materialism within Western intellectual
circles after the failures of metropolitan revolutionary movements in Europe and North
America in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s accelerated this transition. 4 Marxism's
utility as a measure for understanding the past (including imperial pasts) declined, even
while a beleaguered and dwindling set of historians and other scholars reformulated
Marxism in new contexts and for new concerns. 5
Post-structuralist theories formulated by Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault,
and Jacques Derrida came to dominate the new intellectual mood. While some have
construed these new theorists as inheritors of Western Marxism's anti-authoritarian
political project, the theoretical ascendancy of post-structuralism both reflected and
helped to produce a disengagement from Marxism.
6 On the one hand, the arrival of post-
structuralism precipitated a rejection of "universalist" or "left" political causes, including
various metropolitan anti-imperialist movements. On the other hand, the post-
4
See Peter Starr, Logics ofFailed Revolt: French Theory After May '68 (Stanford, 1995), and Immanuel
Wallerstein, The Decline ofAmerican Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New York, 2003).
5 See Dennis Dworkin, Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of
Cultural Studies (Durham, 1999).
b
For a brief but excellent review of this shift in the American historical profession, see Herman Lebovics.
Imperialism and the Corruption ofDemocracies (2006), 100-1 12.
3
structuralists and their followers substituted in Marxism's stead political theories that
conceptualized power almost entirely in cultural terms. 7 Analytical constructs that
recognized the determinative potency of language and discourse, "difference;' the body
and identity soon pervaded academic history and the work of scholars throughout the
humanities. Compared to a highly variegated Marxist political and theoretical project,
however, post-structuralist endeavors seem somewhat impoverished. "The virtuosi of
postmodernism," Philip Pomper reminds us, "have deconstructed networks of signifiers
and tropes, but, unlike liberalism and Marxism, postmodernism has not gained a foothold
in politics and has not directly removed any actual social, economic, or political chains." 8
In this context, literary theorist and critic Edward Said demonstrated the scholarly
and political rewards to be reaped from applying post-structuralist and critical theory to
narratives of empire.
9
Said illuminated the role of Western culture and knowledge in
shaping Western empires, and he inspired a generation of students of comparative
literature and history equally interested in the cultural dynamics and legacies of Western
colonialism and imperialism. Said's influence is evident in the many cultural histories of
empire written by European and American scholars beginning in the 1980s and 1990s.
10
7
For a more critical review of this transformation in Western intellectual culture than that advanced by
Lebovics, see Peter Dews, The Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of
Critical Theory (London, 1987), and Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reijication of
Language and the Writing ofSocial History (Philadelphia, 1990).
8
Philip Pomper, "The History and Theory of Empires," in History and Theory, 44 (2005), 18.
9
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, 2005), and Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1994).
10
For important cultural histories of European empire, see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds..
Tensions ofEmpire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, 1997); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal
Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, 2002). For some of the
best work in the cultural history of American empire, see Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., Cultures
of United States Imperialism (Durham, 1993); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fightingfor American Manhood:
How
Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, 1 998);
Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and
4
This impressive body of scholarship on culture and empire illuminated often disturbing
ways in which imperial relationships crystallized in the West's distorted representations
of the colonized "other." Monograph after monograph documented the ways in which
empire had been finely contoured by western racism, sexism, "scientific" knowledge,
literature, and popular culture.
Unfortunately, much of this post-Said scholarship has been written by academics
trained not as historians but as analysts of literature and other cultural "texts;* (This trend
was only one of many signs of a blurring of already amorphous boundaries between
history and literature). Yet, in the United States, the new cultural history of empire
displaced an earlier revisionist history of American diplomacy and foreign relations that
had incorporated culture as only one causal factor among many others. It also served to
fill an interpretive vacuum left by the nation-centered narratives of American social and
political historians of the 1960s and 1970s. In a globalizing, post-Cold War world, the
cultural history of American empire functioned as an important and perhaps troubling
reminder of the multiple ways in which imperial culture and violence contributed to the
creation of a triumphant United States."
Nevertheless, these new interpretations of American empire suffered from an
significant deficit. They tended to disregard the remarkable insights once offered by
contemporary observers of a now seemingly-distant imperial past. Even though some
Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York, 2000); Gilbert M. Joseph, et. al., eds.. Close Encounters ofEmpire:
Writing the Cultural History of U.S. -Latin American Relations (Durham, 1998); Eileen J. Suarez Findlay,
Imposing Decency: The Politics ofSexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920 (Durham. 1999); Laura
Wexler, Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism (Chapel Hill, 2000); Mary A.
Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism. 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill.
2001 ); and Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy ofEmpire in the Making of U.S. Culture. (Cambridge, 2002).
1
' Ellen Schrecker, ed.. Cold War Triumphialism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism
(New York, 2004); Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, 2002).
5
post-structuralists conflated early modern European thought and philosophy with
Western imperialism, many key Enlightenment thinkers, beginning at least with French
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, had ruminated on the injuries empire appeared to
inflict on metropolitan values and culture. 12 Kindred Renaissance and Enlightenment-era
theorists of republicanism struggled to resolve the ancient dilemma created by tensions
between small-scale republics and territorial expansion. 13 Of course, these sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth-century thinkers tended to regard empire as an essentially
political phenomenon. Western theories of empire turned to the economic realm once the
initial European conquests and mercantilist adventures of the seventeenth century gave
way to the great "age of empire" of the next two centuries, in which European nation-
states, and later the United States, competed for land and resources, markets, and
prestige. Naturally, in this remarkably different context, thinkers like Adam Smith and
Karl Marx easily discerned fundamental features of empire in complex inter-relationships
between political economy, trade, finance and domestic political and social classes.
Smith and Marx did not, however, articulate the classic western theories of
imperialism. Only in the first two decades of the twentieth century, centuries after the
birth of modern European empires, did J.A. Hobson and Lenin develop the classical
Western theories of empire. Hobson, a liberal British economist, located the origins of
British imperialism in British foreign investment and domestic under-consumption. in
which a high amount of saved capital was reinvested not in the metropole to foster higher
12 Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton, 2003).
13 David Armitage, "Empire and Liberty," in Quentin Skinner, et. al., eds, Republicanism: A Shared
European Heritage (Cambridge, 2002).
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domestic consumption, but overseas. 14 Lenin was influenced by Hobson but gave
Hobson's theories a Marxist edge that focused on imperialism as an inevitable result of
competition between nation-states that were shifting to a new political economy rooted in
capitalist monopolies of production and finance. 15 Their seminal ideas structured the
frames in which historians and other intellectuals discussed empire until the cultural turn
at the end of the twentieth century. 16 These thinkers placed capitalism and capitalist
forms of production, distribution and consumption at the center of empire and the
formation of empires.
After more than two decades of cultural histories of empire, it would behoove
historians to reinvigorate older considerations of economy, politics, and class in
narratives of U.S. empire. Scholars may do so without reducing the political positions or
political culture of any one metropolitan class or group vis-a-vis empire to a problem of
its class content. But it seems important for today's historians to realize that empire is
never solely, or perhaps even primarily, caused by cultural factors. Nor is empire
manifest historically only at a level of discourse or other forms of cultural expression; it
is not important because it is a kind of specter that "haunts" the subjects of history by
bearing a "threatening presence" which "invisibly" occupies or takes on a "changing
form."
17 As the astute British historian V.G. Kiernan notes,
14
J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (London, 1902).
15
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage ofCapitalism (New York, 1939).
16
Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds (London, 2004).
17 Ana Laura Stoler, "Intimations of Empire: Predicaments of the Tactile and Unseen," in Stoler, ed.,
Haunted by Empire: Geographies ofIntimacy in North American History (Durham, 2006), I
.
Modern imperialism has been an accretion of elements, not all of equal
weight....Perhaps its ultimate causes, with those of war, are to be found less in
tangible material wants than in the uneasy tensions of societies distorted by class
division, with their reflection in distorted ideas in men's minds. Capitalism is at
bottom a relationship among human beings, and no human relationship, or its
consequences, can have the logic of geometry." 18
Kiernan's observation invites us to investigate the relationship between elites who
promoted modern empires and everyday workers who have also been crucial to the
production, reproduction and projection of modern empires. Historians have long known
that many American elites in the late nineteenth century embraced overseas expansion as
a way to ameliorate the intermittent social crises generated by rapid capitalist
industrialization. Yet, historians have not addressed everyday workers' relationship to the
simultaneous construction of the modern American empire. Clearly, processes of class
formation were imbricated in the structures of domestic and foreign policy in the Gilded
Age and Progressive eras. In these years, American Federation of Labor officials shifted
from opposing U.S. overseas expansion before 1900 to accepting U.S. intervention in an
inter-imperial world war. 19 Very few labor historians, however, have attempted to explain
or explore this political shift in workers' attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy.
The first generation of professional labor historians tended to focus on the
pragmatic and institutional aspects of working-class history, and did not identify any
necessary relationship between class and empire. The "Wisconsin school" of labor
history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, best represented by the work
of John R. Commons and his student Selig Perlman, interpreted modern American
IS
19
V.G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism (New York, 1974), 67
David Montgomery, "Workers' Movements in the U.S. Confront Imperialism: The Twentieth Century
Experience," University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts, November 4, 2006. Paper in author's
possession.
8
unionism as an expression of workers' practical interest in "bread and butter' issues of
wages and working conditions. Commons and Perlman eschewed notions that workers
had seriously confronted larger problems of capitalism or empire.20 While later so-called
"consensus" historians in the early Cold War like Richard Hofstadter wrote little about
laborer se, these scholars basically reiterated the claims of the Wisconsin School when
they argued that a consensual embrace of liberal democracy, capitalism, and modernity
defined American history and marginalized popular workers movements which, they
believed, had been tainted by atavistic nativism and anti-intellectualism. 21
Subsequent revisionist historians, inspired in part by the work of New Left
scholars like William Appleman Williams, flipped this positive consensus on its head.
While Williams and his colleagues acknowledged that the United States was generally a
liberal capitalist society, they depicted America as a nation imprisoned by the political
and economic structures of "corporate liberalism." In their minds, many Americans,
including workers, enjoyed the tangible benefits of affluence and Progressive or New
Deal reforms at the cost of becoming politically impotent in a society dominated and
determined by invidious partnerships between labor, capital and the state. In these early
twentieth-century narratives, workers appeared either as liberal but acquiescent or
collaborationist and compromised. All in all, American workers seemed to have
contributed little to the creation of U.S. foreign policy.
20
David Brody, "The Old Labor History and the New: In Search of an American Working Class," in Labor
History, 20 (1979), 1 1 1-126.
21
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR. (New York, 1955).
22
Williams, Contours ofAmerican History (New York, 1988); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of
Conservatism: A Reinterpretation ofAmerican History, 1900-1916 (New York, 1963); James Weinstein,
The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston, 1968).
Influenced by the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, however, the New
Labor History challenged these conservative interpretations of labor's past. David
Montgomery, David Brody, Herbert Gutman and a new generation of labor historians
exposed heretofore ignored histories of working-class oppositional movements and
cultures, all forged in the fires of war and reconstruction, shop floor and community
struggles, resistant and residual pre-industrial immigrant culture, and socialist politics.
Where others had detected accommodation, these historians exposed significant strains of
radicalism in U.S. working-class political culture. 23 Yet, like their predecessors, this
generation of labor historians did not deeply investigate workers' political attitudes
regarding war, continental expansion, or overseas empire. A few New Left-era historians
studied labor officials' seemingly sudden attachment to the Progressive state in the World
War 1 period. 24 The gradual shift of AFL President Samuel Gompers and other moderate
labor leaders from a traditional anti-statist voluntarism to an alliance with the Democratic
Party and Woodrow Wilson's domestic and foreign policies was important, and it
25
garnered a friendly (but preciously ephemeral) federal labor policy." These studies,
however, focused only on labor leaders; only a few rather narrow case studies of other
23
See David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era (Cambridge, 1960); David Montgomery,
Beyond Equality (Urbana, 1 967), Worker 's Control in Early America: Studies in the History of Work,
Technology, and Labor Struggles (Cambridge, 1979); Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in
Industrializing America (New York, 1976). For an essay that links rather than contrasts the "Wisconsin''
and "New Labor History" schools of U.S. labor history, see Leon Fink, "John R. Commons, Herbert
Gutman, and the Burden of Labor History," reprinted in Fink, In Search of the Working Class: Essays in
American Labor History and Political Culture (Chicago, 1994), 3-14.
24
Frank L. Grubbs, Jr., The Strugglefor Labor Loyalty: Gompers, the A.F. ofL, and the Pacifists, 1917-
1920 (Durham, 1968); Ron Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1969);
and Simeon Larson, Labor and Foreign Policy: Gompers, the AFL, and the First World War. 1914-1918
(Cranbury, 1975).
25
Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation ofLabor and Political Activism, 1881-
1917 (Cambridge, 1998).
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labor statesmen and activists in the Progressive era followed. 26 These histories plowed
new fields of research, but the value of their harvest remained ambiguous.
At the same time, however, Americans opposed to the welfare-warfare policies of
the anti-communist Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations openly attacked the
labor movement for its complicity in America's Cold War aggressions. 27 These critics
documented labor's complicity with American imperialism and revealed AFL-CIO
leaders' little-known careers as anti-communist labor diplomats. New Left writers
pilloried historians like Philip Taft who dared defend labor's anti-communist
statesmanship. However, this literature seldom looked farther back than World War II. an
oversight that implicitly reinforced the consensus historians' belief in workers*
essentially timeless conservatism concerning foreign policy. Only long after Vietnam did
historians uncover a surprising amount of disquiet among rank-and-file American
workers during this war, a development that somewhat undermined the rather harsh
damnations New Left contemporaries hurled against "hardhat" hawks in the working
class.
28
If New Left critics attacked labor's complicity with Cold War-era American
empire, recent cultural histories have too often recapitulated the tenor of these charges in
26 Gregg Andrews, Shoulder to Shoulder 9 : The American Federation of Labor, the United States, and the
Mexican Revolution, 1910-1924 (Berkeley, 1991), and Elizabeth McKillen, Chicago Labor and the Quest
for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914-1924 (Ithaca, 1995).
27
Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy. For a recent analysis of organized labor's
political conservatism on foreign policy in the twentieth century that reiterates the spirit of New Left critics,
see Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the
Tragedy ofAmerican Labor (New York, 1 999).
28
Jeffrey Coker, Confronting American Labor: The New Left Dilemma (Columbia, 2002); Peter Levy, The
New Left and Labor in the 1960s (Chicago, 1994); Edmund F. Wehrle, Between a River and a Mountain:
The AFL-CIO and the Vietnam War (Ann Arbor, 2005). See also Marc Linder, Wars ofAttrition: Vietnam,
the Business Roundtable, and the Decline of Construction Unions (Iowa City, 1999) and Philip Foner's
contemporary and heroic account of labor anti-war activity, American Labor and the Indo-China War (New
York, 1971).
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their indictments of working-class culture. Matthew Frye Jacobson's synthetic narrative
of America's imperial political culture at the turn of the last century, Barbarian Virtues,
is a case in point. While Jacobson displays a refreshing respect for the emphasis
revisionist diplomatic historians placed on the causal links between U.S. industrial
capitalism and imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century, few American workers
in his book escape the cross-class appeals of herrenvolk republicanism and nationalism.
Yet, Jacobson hardly makes a compelling case for labor's complicity with empire. Me
bases his indictment of imperial American labor in passing remarks, offering only a few
rather a-historical and de-contextualized references to statements made by Samuel
Gompers and Eugene Debs. 30 We learn little about the views or cultural politics of the
mass of organized and unorganized workers regarding questions of empire in the years
between 1876 and World War I. Barbarian Virtues is an eye-opening and original work
of synthesis that irrefutably illuminates the cultural bases of modern American empire.
Yet, the cultures Jacobson describes are cultures that emerge only from the rarified
expressions of America's cultural, political and economic elite. Jacobson overlooks the
statements of American workers or the poor, rarely looking deeper than a few leaders
claiming to represent rank-and-file workers. In effect, Jacobson basically extends
Turner's emphasis on the new American empire as a continuation of earlier continental
expansion, important for its relationship to politics, immigration, markets, and military
intervention, but unrelated to social divisions within the metropole.
This study maintains that modernity has always retained a dynamic historical
relationship between labor, citizenship and empire. In the years between 1890 and 1920.
29
Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues.
30
Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues, 82-83, 86-87, 229.
12
most workers in the United States were integrated into a political culture which they
subjectively experienced as robust nationalism but what objectively and historically may
be called a political culture of "imperial citizenship." This peculiar and particularly
modem political culture helped to resolve contradictions lingering between a declining
nineteenth-century republicanism and an ascendant twentieth-century liberalism. Events
at the end of the nineteenth century forced Americans simultaneously to confront the end
of land-based westward continental expansion and social explosions caused by rapid,
unregulated capitalist industrialization. As the 1890s progressed, American elites
increasingly looked beyond America's shores for solutions to the nation's domestic
crises. By the end of the 1920s, this political culture of imperial citizenship had come to
structure the political discourse and activity of all social classes, including workers.
Some elites, and many prominent Republican, Populist and trade union leaders,
feared that overseas expansion would prove detrimental to America's republican political
tradition of virtuous and manly independence and self-rule. Yet, between the Spanish-
American War and the aftermath of World War I, many working-class leaders, and many
workers themselves, came to embrace a foreign policy characterized by imperial
intervention in other nations and societies. There was nothing inevitable about this deadly
embrace. It coalesced in complicated interactions between patterns of race, gender,
popular culture, military service, immigration, and radicalism and anti-radicalism.
Imperial citizenship also was shaped by larger changes in consumer culture, political
economy and workplace management. This thesis explores only a few of the various
ways in which American workers and their leaders came to celebrate their individual and
13
collective identities as citizens of a republic which, in fact, quickly was becoming the
most advanced empire in world history.
Working-class imperial citizenship in the United States was not a form of "false
consciousness," nor can it accurately be identified as merely one variant or manifestation
of American nationalism. Undoubtedly, ever since the American Revolution, many
artisans, laborers and workers have believed that they were part of an "imagined"
American community. 31 Nevertheless, it is of paramount importance for historians to
acknowledge that these workers, in the larger context of modern world history, either
contributed to-and perhaps were conscripted by-the imperial policies of America"
s
political and economic elite. Indeed, our historical perspective of American empire
shifts dramatically if we analyze the construction of American empire not from the
perspective of cultural, political and economic elites, but from a "bottom-up" perspective.
Indeed, such a perspective brings to the surface certain liabilities inherent in
recent cultural approaches to the history of empire. Cultural historians may correctly
claim that Americans of all classes culturally embraced empire, from the colonial period
well into the modern era. Certainly, many if not most ordinary Americans in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shared with elites an interest in continental expansion
as a means to secure precious land and resources, often at the expense of indigenous
peoples and other imperial powers. Yet, our engagement with this question is altered
when we recognize that few workers accrued direct, material benefit from the very
31
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism
(London, 1996).
32 The concept of cultural conscription employed here is found in Renda, Taking Haiti, 17-29.
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different kind of overseas U.S. commercial and political expansion that began in earnest
at the conclusion of the nineteenth century.
Therefore, for elites to interest American workers in forming an empire, these
workers first had to be culturally and figuratively (and sometimes literally) conscripted
by the nation's political, economic and cultural elite. Between 1890 and 1920, many
workers came to embrace United States foreign policies which their working class
predecessors in the nineteenth century would have regarded as dangerously antithetical to
republican principles and practice. Yet, a working-class political culture of imperial
citizenship was forged not only in the fires of violent U.S. military and commercial
expansion at the edge of America's turbulent frontiers.
The American empire, like all empires, was an internal and external project. In the
years between 1890 and 1920, the sites of American workers' consumption, work,
collective organizations, politics, and immigrant and ethnic culture and identity, all
became battlegrounds of empire. It was no accident that workers confronted agents of the
state, capital and urban reformers attempting to colonize them and their culture at the
very same moment that the United States searched abroad for cheap labor, raw materials,
and consumer markets. In the years prior to World War I, many Americans feared (and
some hoped) that contests for political, social and cultural power and authority inside and
outside the United States might culminate in worldwide social revolution. After the
reaction of the war years, however, few doubted that American society had been
successfully mobilized to repress internal forms of dissent against a new kind of America
and a new kind of American presence in the world. With this understanding, the story of
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the rather conservative culture that came to characterize American workers and organized
labor in the Cold War begins not in 1945, or even 1917, but in the 1 890s.
As will be obvious to the reader, Charles S. Maiefs recent comparative essay on
American empire has been enormously influential. 330n the other hand, theories of empire
have not actually advanced far beyond the conceptual frameworks established by
classical theorists like Hobson, Lenin and Joseph Schumpeter. 34 These older theorists
inform a study of labor and empire by clarifying our main problematic: the historical
relationship between states and the formation of state structures (or, more properly, the
formation of empire-states and empire-state structures) and classes and class formation.
Here I tend to agree with Etienne Balibar and others who observe that classes and states
do not develop autonomously. "What history shows is that social relations are not
established between hermetically closed classes, but that they are formed across classes
including the working class,' 1 Balibar argues. "The state, by means of its institutions, its
mediating or administrative functions, its ideals and discourse, is always already present
in the constitution of class." Modern states, whether nation-states or empire-states, have
always mediated and influenced class identity and class relationships through categories
of citizenship.
33
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Eugen Weber's work on the colonization and cultural modernization of the
French peasantry is also highly relevant for studies of the relationship between culture
and empire- and nation-formation in western societies. 36 Some have criticized Weber for
failing to recognize that the formation of national identities in France during the Third
Republic took place in a larger context of the French empire. 37 However, the virtues of
Weber's study lies in his observation that the formation of national identities an
important phase in the history of empire-states and the building of empire-states- is
essentially a phenomenon driven by political and economic elites. They implement
strategies for such a project from above, within but also beyond the borders of their self-
defined nation-state, for a variety of reasons and from a multiplicity of motivations not
always reducible to political or material concerns. I also share Weber's conclusion that
the formation of modern political culture and political identity is a process that occurs
both inside and outside the established borders of states.
Ultimately, in the words of one observer of labor and empire, "empire building is
ID
essentially a form of class warfare from above." Unlike much recent scholarship that
emphasizes the power of the subject in shaping the forces and outcomes of history, this
study affirms that empire all too often concedes little space for individual subjects to
influence the course of history. This does not imply that non-elites have not affected the
contours of history. They have, and they will continue to do so. Yet, it must be
36 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization ofRural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford,
1976).
37
Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, 2005),
175-176
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Empire, 58.
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recognized that spaces for oppositional action and ideas tend to be severely limited under
conditions of empire and empire-formation.
Although this study is intended as an intervention in American labor, foreign
policy, immigration, and political and social history, its central purpose is to reaffirm the
signal importance of class and labor in shaping modern societies and subjective
experiences of modernity. Despite many recent and rather scholastic claims that "class is
dead," it is perhaps more accurate to describe the body as badly bruised but not yet
expired.
39
Nor is the utility of "class" as an analytical category of historical study likely
to decline in the near or distant future. Specifically, this study is primarily a history of the
class dimensions of a great transformation in American political culture.
Given an indeterminacy to definitions of "political culture" in recent scholarship,
it is important to define exactly what I mean by the term. By political culture I mean the
complex field of human activity and discourse concerning the power and identity of
different social groups in any given society. Political culture is both constructed by
human subjects and imposed on them by the past. The concept of political culture
employed here includes but extends beyond individual participation in (or discourses
regarding) traditional political practices or institutions, such as elections, parties, policy-
making, and statecraft.
Political culture, however, does not itself maintain any essential power to
determine history, nor is political culture a structure whose referent consists only of
discourse or language. Political cultures are constructed historically from social and
political interaction and struggles between different groups in societies over lime; each
39
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social group develops its own specific political cultural contents. 40 Political culture is
never merely discursive in origin or form. As Ronald Aminzade, a historical sociologist
of nineteenth-century French labor has argued, identities and political culture arc
constituted politically, and often through organizations, institutions and ideologies, but
never fully separate from social and historical realities:
'The translation of class interests into political objectives occurs in a
structured process of conflict and alliances, through organizational and
ideological mechanisms linking social structure to political behavior. Translating
interests based on one's position as a landowner, shopkeeper, worker, or capitalist
into subjective political dispositions and collective political action depends on a
process that is not a simple reflection of class structure. Institutions, such as
political parties, and ideologies, like republicanism, play a key role in this
process. Contrary to what proponents of abandoning class analysis suggest,
however, these institutions and ideologies are not independent of material
conditions and class forces; nor are they capable of simply creating interests out
of discourses, unconstrained by material realities."41
Furthermore, if we accept that historical events are almost always rooted in multiple
causes, then it is also reasonable for historians to identify and interpret those causes and
sift through them to determine the relative significance of each. The study of political
culture is therefore also inherently comparative.
42
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This study is also informed by what is not present in the historical record, for one
of the essential features of American empire is a remarkable absence of introspection,
debate and deliberation regarding empire and its costs and benefits to Americans and
others.
This study has geographical, chronological and methodological limitations. 1 have
focused the questions I outline above primarily through the history of workers in Boston.
Massachusetts, because the Bay State's capital has always been a seat of empire of one
form or another. Furthermore, while it may seem that I excessively analyze the ideas and
activity of only a few working people, intellectuals and organizers, I do not claim that
these subjects at any time between 1890 and 1920 represented more than a militant
minority within a highly variegated U.S. working class. Furthermore, the militant
working-class minority that challenged American empire in this period was hardly
composed of perfect individuals; in many ways they were decidedly not heroic or
infallible, and should not be portrayed as such. The narrative is therefore loosely
structured around one rather fallible and enigmatic American whose life in many ways
represents and recapitulates the complicated trajectories of working-class citizenship in
the United States at the turn of the last century.
Morrison I. Swift is certainly one of the more unknown, misunderstood and
unappreciated personas in the history of American radicalism. A promising young
philosopher who abandoned a life in the academy for a revolutionary vocation among the
poor and unemployed of the urban northeast (and Boston especially). Swift sheds light on
a particular kind of working-class movement agitator against empire which has received
20
very little attention in recenl histories of U.S. empire. In Chapter One, "The Waves of
Expansion" I set the contexl for Swift's ideas and activities by providing a necessaril}
broad sketch of Boston's working-class republican political culture, from colonial times
tO the Gilded Ago. In Chapter Two. "The Social Origins of the New Empire," I discuss
the political and social context in which socialists like Swift came tO understand
American politieal economy and articulated an alternative to it. In Chapter I luce. "The
Modern Moment." I trace the alternative discourse againsl empire charted In working
class radicals like Swift which both hearkened hack tO B fading republican pasl and
looked forward to a future society based on social harmony, not imperial expansion. M\
epilogue concludes this largely biographical narrative and offers some speculation aboul
workers and empire in the twentieth century.
Lastly, in the course of research and writing I have wondered if there is not a
kindred historical connection between Swift and his contemporary .hick I ondon,
I ondon'S literary talents completely dwarf Swift's marginal effusions. Bu1 London, like
Swift, identified with the American working class. London, also like Swift, was a
socialist w ith his fair share of cultural blemishes by today's standards (notably, his racism
towards Asian immigrant workers). The People of the Abyss remains his finest statement
on die deprivations of industrial capitalism, bul he situated his observations in I ondon's
bast hud, nol Hell's Kitchen or Skid Row . Written only because die author was unable to
travel to South Africa lo report on die Boer War, The People oj the AhySS operates as an
evocative metaphor for the culture that Swift, a man with middle class origins, entered
and adopted in his own kind of •Mumming" with die urban American poor and
unemployed. In die preface to his account of English slum hie, London
described, in
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prose of simple elegance, his approach to observing the urban working-class "under-
world" of Western empire in terms that inform my reading of the history he witnessed:
I went down into the under-world of London with an attitude of mind
which I may best liken to that of the explorer. I was open to be convinced by the
evidence of my eyes, rather than by the teachings of those who had not seen, or by
the words of those who had seen and gone before. Further, 1 took with me certain
simple criteria with which to measure the life of the under-world. That which
made for more life, for physical and spiritual health, was good; that which made
for less life, which hurt, and dwarfed, and distorted life, was bad. 43
Jack London, The People of the Abvss (London, 1 992), 9.
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CHAPTER 2
THE WAGES OF EXPANSION: LABOR, CITIZENSHIP,
AND EMPIRE IN EARLY ANGLO-AMERICA
"Nations... are, in my view, dual phenomena essentially constructed from
above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in
terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people,
which are not necessary national and still less nationalist." 1
In 1890, when Morrison Isaac Swift arrived in Boston, this cultural and financial
capital of New England still enjoyed its well-earned reputation as the Eden of the
American nation. Only a few miles from Boston's busy city streets, battlefields in
Concord and Lexington still marked where shots heard around the world had once
announced the birth of a brave new nation. These hallowed grounds also hosted new
statues of proud minutemen-farmers, monuments that signified a distinctly Yankee
celebration of American national identity. Nevertheless, by the 1890s, an earlier historical
memory and consciousness that might have viewed the revolution as not merely national,
but also anti-imperial in nature, seemed to have passed into oblivion.
The rebellious colonists of 1775 were far more cognizant of the imperial and
global context of the Revolution than the everyday Gilded Age American. If nothing else,
the verse adorning a plaque at Concord, affixed upon a stonewall over the graves of
British soldiers, indicates that the new citizens of Massachusetts-only recently the
subjects of an English king-were conscious of the costs and benefits of empire. They also
1 E J Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth. Reality (Cambridge,
1990),
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seemed sensitive to the common sufferings that empire imposed on all peoples. The
plaque celebrated America's victory, but also acknowledged the suffering of British
opponents:
" They came three thousand miles and died,
To keep the past upon its throne;
Unheard, beyond the ocean tide,
Their English mother made her moan."2
Such verse reflects a fervent affirmation of a particularly national identity that
pervaded the early American republic, from the constitutional period to the end of the
nineteenth century. White Protestant male workers of British ancestry in Massachusetts
especially identified with the republiean political culture forged in the revolution. Even
by the early 1890s, the Yankee citizenry of Massachusetts, including workers, members
of the middle class and Boston Brahmins, still identified with the republiean legacy
established by their revolutionary predecessors.
Yet, for some Gilded Age Americans, the American republic seemed to have lost
its moorings. At the end of the nineteenth century, American military interventions in
Latin America and the Pacific Kim forced many Yankees and other Americans to
confront apparently new and dissonant tensions between a specifically American form o!
republicanism and the emergence of a uniquely American soil of empire. A few
Bostonians, including newcomer Morrison Swift, soon recognized the organic
connections between social and political developments within the United Stales and the
extension of U.S. power beyond continental borders.
2 From James Russell Lowell, "Lines," in The ( 'omplete Poems ofJames Russell
Lowell (Hew York, 1 898).
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The common, cross-class bonds of republican citizenship celebrated by many of
Boston's white male artisans and laborers after the consolidation of the Revolution
exerted a powerful centrifugal pull on working-class identity and political culture in the
early Republic. 3 Nevertheless, the social transformation of the United States, in which an
economy based on small-scale artisanal and agricultural production gradually gave way
to one dominated by large-scale capitalist corporations and powerful investors, threatened
popular notions of republican citizenship. At the same time, many white male workers
expressed political allegiance to an expanding New World republic of economic
opportunity, political liberty, and basic social equality. The nation of which these artisans
and workers imagined they were a part, however, had always been much more and much
less than the representative republic their artisan forebears had intended to establish.
Recent histories of the United States that focus on the culture of American empire
largely ignore these workers, even while the authors of these histories have sought to
affirm the continuity of empire in the longue duree of American history.
4
But the
American empire prior to the 1 890s was markedly different from the American empire
after the 1890s. In social terms, popular support for American empire was disrupted by
extra-continental expansion. Before the annexation of Hawaii and the conquest of Cuba
and the Philippines, American workers and American elites reaped considerable material
3 James R. Green and Hugh Carter Donoghue, Boston's Workers: A Labor History (Boston, 1979). 1-22.
4 Andy Doolen, Fugitive Empire: Locating Early American Imperialism (Minneapolis, 2005); Gretchen
Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings (Durham, 2005); and David Kazanjian, The Colonizing Trick: National
Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America (Minneapolis, 2003). Shelley Streeby, American
Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production ofPopular Culture (Berkeley. 2002) is a welcome
exception as Streeby analyzes the class contents of popular working class literature and culture
in relation
to issues of expansion, primarily during the Mexican-American War. But in seeking to
emphasize the
continuity of American empire, Streeby also does not discern that the social basis of
empire changed from
expansion for land and resources in the continent to markets and raw materials
abroad, a difference which
separates pre-1898 U.S. expansion from the expansions that followed.
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and psychological rewards, both direct and indirect, from American expansion. Most
workers believed that they benefited or could benefit from the availability of lands
secured in multiple wars and treaties. While farming was not always a realistic option for
many men and women of the landless urban artisanry or the poor and unemployed, the
possibility of land ownership in the West signified for many Americans the resiliency of
a republican Jeffersonian political economy, a faith bolstered by the fact that some
individual white males could still preserve their manly virtue and secure a livelihood, and
delay the decline of an agrarian republic threatened by the luxurious vices of commerce,
through agricultural pursuits. These western lands also contained precious minerals that,
beginning with the 1 849 gold rush, commanded the attention of Yankees seeking quick
riches. When violent expansionism seemed to be motivated not by the search for land and
minerals but by an interest in commerce and fulfilling an American mission in the world,
the social basis of American empire changed.
EMPIRE-STATES, LABOR, AND ANGLO-AMERICAN EMPIRES OF THE EARLY
ATLANTIC WORLD
European political theorists of the sixteenth century, including Machiavelli, were
aware of the centrality of political economy in explaining the rise and fall of empires. By
reading the history of ancient empires, political thinkers of the Renaissance period
struggled to reconcile classical political theory with the rapid political and social
developments transforming feudal Europe. In particular, they turned to Sallust, especially
his Bellum CatiUmae. Sallust identified a positive and original relationship between great
republican states and liberty. For Sallust, Rome demonstrated that republics which based
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their greatness on expansion faced inevitable decline and corruption. 5 Machiavelli
extended Sallust by arguing rather pessimistically that all republics faced these fatal
tensions between greatness and liberty. He did not identify any necessary relationship
between class, labor and empire. But Machiavelli worried that popular reforms like those
instituted by Gaius Marius, who allowed foreigners and the propertyless to join the
Roman legions, would cause internal unrest and, like Sulla's dictatorship, finally destroy
republican liberty.
While Machiavelli feared that expansionist republics without popular armies
risked becoming vulnerable to states that had militaries, he also concluded that greatness
was ultimately more important than republican liberty and well worth the risks. This
position had its critics. The Venetian Paolo Paruta suggested in 1599 that "the perfection
of Government lies in making a City virtuous, not in making her Mistress of many
countries. Nay the increasing of Territories, as it is commonly coupled with some
injustice, so it is remote from the true end of good Laws, which never part from what is
honest. Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived; which denotes their
imperfection."
6
British republican political thought of the same period inherited this same tension
between empire and liberty. In 1594, Richard Beacon, a former British official in Ireland,
published Solon His Follie, a treatise on the problem of Ireland. Like Machiavelli,
Beacon also distinguished between expansionist and non-expansionist republics, both of
which seemed condemned to decline. After the civil war, however, as British commerce
5
David Armitage, "Empire and Liberty: A Republican Dilemma," in Quentin Skinner, et. al., eds..
Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage (Cambridge, 2002).
6
Paolo Paruta (1657), quoted in Armitage, "Empire and Liberty," 33-34.
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and trade increased, political economists like Charles Davenant and philosophers like
David Hume reasoned that commerce might rescue modern republics from the terrible
fate of previous expansionist republics. To Davenant and Hume, the naval power
necessary for protecting ocean-going commerce seemed to obviate any traditional
dangers posed by authoritarian land-based armies. The British Empire therefore could
safely achieve international repute by conquering the high seas, not new territory. In
France, Montesquieu endorsed the relatively peaceful commerce of Britain's new kind of
empire, even while he condemned the expansionist "universal monarchies" of the
Continent. 7
British mercantilist theory and policy tried to reconcile emerging conceptions of
political liberty with imperial expansion. By advancing mercantilist political economy,
British elites worked for a new commercial empire that would increase private wealth
and also relieve domestic social tensions by generating wealth for the common welfare.
Advocates of overseas colonization tended to share the sentiments of Francis Bacon who,
in 1628, fearing that 'The rebellions of the belly are the worst," suggested that "The first
remedy or prevention, is to remove by all means possible that material cause of sedition,
which is want and poverty in the estate."
8
The liberal political philosophy and political
economy of mercantilist England and Scotland in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries deepened an emphasis on commercial empire as a moral means to preserve
7
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social stability and pursue the common good. Commercial empire would be rooted in the
accumulation of private property at the expense of other empire-states.
John Locke explored the social import of this historical departure in the history of
empires. Herman Lebovics suggests that Locke's Second Treatise actually provided the
first grand theory of social empire. 9 In arguing that government functioned primarily to
preserve individual property, Locke necessarily had to argue that individuals required
private property to participate in the state. But England in Locke's time afforded fewer
and fewer opportunities for most English subjects to amass individual wealth, so
naturally Locke suggested North America as a solution. The land there could rightfully be
given to Europeans who, unlike the natives, would maximize its productivity. Primitive
accumulation in America would secure the political loyalties of a population facing land
enclosures in a restored England. Locke, Lebovics contends, "made the colonial empire a
vital bond between Britain's new elite and those they governed," thereby strengthening
"the nascent liberalism of British society by building into it the promise of growth, of
more for all, of social peace through empire."
10
Scottish political economist Adam Smith soon thereafter argued that the British
empire needed markets for its expanding domestic manufacturing surplus. Smith believed
that such an endeavor could be accomplished only by military forces composed of
citizen-soldiers, not corrupt mercenary armies. Smith's ideal English subject would both
accept the new industrial division of labor engendered by commercial capitalism and
serve in the British imperial navy and army. As one student of Smith has noted, "It was
9
Lebovics, Imperialism and the Corruption ofDemocracies, 87-99.
10
Ibid., 98.
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the existence of the empire which made it possible to rely rather upon the division of
labor than upon mercantilist policy to sustain and increase the wealth of the rich
country."
11
Imperial expansion was therefore intimately linked to a new socialization of
labor in the British isles. Even Smith, however, worried that the metropolitan division of
labor which fostered the wealth and glory of empire would necessarily degrade the
English laborer. But he refrained from supporting the enfranchisement of the laboring
masses, lest "dependent" laborers be forced to follow the political will of employers as
1
")
slaves followed masters.
Therefore, while some British republican, mercantilist and liberal thinkers
attempted to theorize empire as a social palliative for non-elites within the long transition
from feudalism to capitalist modernity, they also expressed fear about commercial
empire's relationship to metropolitan artisans and workers. Commercial empire seemed
to enrich individuals of all social classes, but the new economic forms wrought by
Europe's nascent commercial capitalism also threatened social stability and challenged
the republican political order. At the social bottom of an ascendant English empire-state,
however, English commoners in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often seemed
reluctant to accept the costs of empire.
Though most commoners who supported the English constitutionalist and
Protestant forces in the English Civil War genuinely embraced citizenship in a new
republican state, many protested a new political order which based an exclusive franchise
on property ownership. A growing number of radical republicans also actively opposed
' 1
Armitage, "Empire and Liberty," 44-45; Williams, The Contours ofAmerican History,
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the domestic and foreign costs of the new state's imperial policies. In 1649, rank and file
soldiers of the New Model Army resisted conscription into forces meant to assist Oliver
Cromwell's Ireland campaign. In 1657 and 1661, English commoners distressed by land
enclosures, various forms of unfree labor, and press gangs recruiting for colonial
adventures in Ireland and the Caribbean organized dramatic but unsuccessful armed
rebellions against the Protectorate. The rebels included men only recently returned from
the American colonies, where they had been radical antinomian followers of Anne
Hutchinson and exiled from the Bay Colony for heresy (a few also had actively opposed
colonial slavery and depredations against indigenous peoples, including the massacre at
Mystic, Connecticut). These men returned to the mother country to fight for a Protestant
republic, only to suffer the indignities of conscription and enclosures in the postwar
period.
13
Individual and collective resistance to the extreme violence of empire and
commercial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not limited to
New England; it was manifested in countless acts of protest throughout the Anglo-
American Atlantic world. 14 Not all Englishmen readily accepted the older but maturing
political economy of Atlantic empire and the limitations it placed on their rights as
citizens of an expanding commonwealth.
The crises of the North American colonies exposed domestic class tensions
inherent in the political economy of Anglo-American Atlantic empire, even as they
generated powerful new national identities and claims to republican citizenship among
men and women of all classes. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Boston. While
13 John Donoghue, "Unfree Labor, Imperialism, and Radical Republicanism in the Atlantic
World, 1630-
1 661 ," in Labor: Working-Class History ofthe Americas, 4(2004), 47-68.
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revolutionary Bostonians in the 1760s and 1770s may have found a common political
cause in their opposition to British policies and their desire for independence, the
meanings of that collective struggle varied across class lines. Colonial Boston, and the
larger colonial society of which it was a part, was not a class society. 15 But Boston was
part of a colonial society whose members responded to empire in different ways, often
according to race, gender and religion, but also individual class experience and interest.
The imperial subjects of New England were hardly averse to expansion. Indeed,
in 1748, adventurous and enterprising men of all pedigrees joined the successful
campaign to capture Louisburg and North Atlantic trade routes and fishing grounds.
Following the French and Indian War, however, New England's commercial elites
increasingly resented British intervention in a somewhat separate but integrated North
American and Caribbean commercial economy. While these interventions caused elites to
eventually rally around complete independence, Massachusetts' commercial elite hardly
envisioned a new republic based upon an alternative political economy. On the contrary,
onerous British regulations had to be removed precisely because Boston's merchants
hoped to establish what Boston patriot James Bowdoin and other revolutionary notables
called an "empire of liberty."
16
Happily, elite colonists' resentments toward Parliament, and eventually toward
the King, were congruent with the frustrations of everyday Bostonians who daily chafed
against the privations of British imperial policy. Everyday Bostonians joined the
revolution to free themselves of these policies and in the process struggled for equal
15 Ronald Schultz, "A Class Society? The Nature of Inequality in Early America," in Carla
Gardina Pestana
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political participation in a virtuous New World republic. 17 But it should be noted that
Boston's artisans, like the "mechanics" of other colonial cities, did not intend to establish
a separate American "empire." This word appears primarily in the discourse of the patriot
leadership in Massachusetts and other colonies, whose ranks were largely constituted by
upper-class white men who favored American greatness, but for whom "empire" did not
necessarily imply territorial expansion. 18 Artisans, on the other hand, hoped merely to
establish a republic based on manly economic and political independence.
The story of George Robert Twelves Hewes, a revolutionary war veteran and
shoemaker, reflects the experiences that motivated many everyday Bostonians to risk life
and livelihood for the patriot cause. No evidence suggests that Hewes joined the
Revolution in order to build a lasting American empire. But Hewes did refer his
biographers to the multiple humiliations he suffered and witnessed as a young Boston
resident in the years preceding the war. Once British troops occupied Boston, a city of
sixteen thousand residents, in the summer of 1768, Hewes was constantly stopped by
sentries. When a British soldier cheated Hewes in a transaction, he complained to the
man's commander; he was horrified to learn that the soldier received three hundred and
fifty lashes for the transgression. He watched one British regular harass and rob a woman
on the street. Most important, Hewes was one of many Boston artisans and laborers
threatened by moonlighting British soldiers competing with colonials for scarce
employment. On March 5, 1770, Hewes watched British troops kill five of his fellow
workingmen-four of whom he knew personally-in the Boston massacre.
1
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Hewes suffered the violence of empire personally as well. Four years after the
massacre, Hewes tried to prevent Malcolm Hawkes, an unpopular customs official and
loyalist, from beating a small boy. Hawkes in turn knocked Hewes unconscious (soon
thereafter Hawkes was tarred and feathered by a group of Hewes' friends). In explaining
his decision to join the revolutionary navy in 1776, Hewes told one biographer that he
"was continually reflecting upon the unwarrantable sufferings inflicted on the citizens of
Boston by the usurpation and tyranny of Great Britain"; his "mind was excited with an
unextinguishable desire to aid in chastising them."20 Immediate and earthly causes
motivated Hewes and his fellow artisans to engage in revolutionary politics.
As revolutionary rhetoric and activity escalated, Boston's artisans grew
determined to wrest the benefits and rights of republican citizenship for themselves. To
mount an effective opposition, radical Whig leaders like Samuel Adams and John
Hancock were compelled to curry support from Boston's plebian majority. In doing so,
however, the leadership had to accommodate artisans' desire for political equality, or at
least some influence in public affairs. Boston's workers did not organize separate
revolutionary committees as did their compatriots in Philadelphia or New York.
21
But
Whig leaders several times reduced the property bar to the franchise in order to
incorporate Boston's workers in public protest meetings against the British. By
participating in the revolutionary conflict, Boston workers like Hewes hoped to found a
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virtuous republic in which Americans of all classes could enjoy the equality and benefits
of political citizenship-a truly radical departure in the long history of the British empire.
These workers and artisans, however, fought for political independence because they
hoped to establish an independent republican state. In the end, their trials and tribulations
furthered the formation of what revolutionary elites conceived as a New World empire.
The formation of the American state is necessarily a history of the formation of a
type of empire-state entirely new in the annals of world history. Indeed, as one historian
argues, "The Atlantic World was defined by states but colonized by empires," and this
applies to the United States as much as any other Euro-American power. Indeed, the
Constitution ensured that the former American colonies would become more than a mere
confederation of individual states. As legal scholars and legal historians have recently
noted, the founders' national charter laid a firm but also flexible and somewhat
ambiguous foundation for the territorial expansion of the American state.
24 By ensuring
central taxation through tariffs, by enabling the creation of a central army, by freeing
interstate commerce and regulating trade through common tariffs, and by developing a
process by which territories could gain statehood, the Constitution enabled American
citizens of all classes to eventually partake in the benefits of empire.
Indeed, the majority of Boston's artisans and tradesmen supported the Federalists
in the creation and ratification of the Constitution. They saw no contradiction between the
imperial nature of the document and their republican principles. They seemed keenly
23
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interested in protecting domestic manufacturers against the flood of cheap British imports
then causing economic havoc and agrarian unrest in western Massachusetts. But Boston
artisans did not support anti-federalists or rebels led by revolutionary veteran Daniel
25
Shays. These "mechanics" in fact were a sizeable element in America's first celebration
of the ratification of the constitution by the convention. On February 8, 1788, this parade,
arguably the first labor-organized parade in American history, included nearly 90 percent
of Boston's 1,250 master artisans. 26 The new nation was more than the sum of its parts
precisely for the reason that the national constitution allowed for more-more prosperity
and more land-to be enjoyed by white male citizens of all occupations and social classes.
As urban and rural America experienced a slow but steady transition to modern
capitalism, the political culture of artisanal republicanism that infused working-class
• 27
political culture in Boston in the late eighteenth century came under increasing stress.*"
Many aging veterans, Hewes among them, began to actively press the federal and state
governments for financial support. Beginning in 1818 with the passage of the Pension
Act, American veterans for the first time applied to the state for financial support they
believed they had earned through military service-no small matter for men who prized
manly and virtuous independence.
28
Although many states gave soldiers small land
grants, sometimes in lieu of pay or bounties, most poor veterans did not receive even a
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pittance for their service. In Maine, part of the new American empire's New England
frontier, thousands of revolutionary war veterans were forced to squat on small pieces of
enormous land-grant properties, owned by the great proprietors of Boston. 29
Perhaps most important, the political economy of the Jeffersonian period fostered
increasing tensions in urban centers between both master artisans and journeymen, and
between those who identified as "producers" and local commercial and financial elites. 30
As conflict revealed subterranean tensions lurking just beneath the social surface, citizens
of all classes laid claim to a common revolutionary heritage. Amidst strikes and the
formation of the first citywide trade unions in the United States, political discourse in
Boston started to bifurcate along divisions inevitably engendered by a maturing and
expansionist capitalist society.
THE WAGES OF WESTWARD EXPANSION: LABOR AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC AND ANTEBELLUM BOSTON
In the years immediately before and after the Civil War, most Boston workers
seemed to benefit from the expansionist capitalist political economy then altering the
United States. While some artisans, tradesmen and laborers joined the nation's earliest
trade unions in order to defend themselves against the most deleterious effects of the
capitalist market and capitalist production, opposition to a highly expansionist capitalist
political economy did not materialize. A vocal and growing minority of white male
29
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Yankee workers actively opposed slavery in the antebellum period, in part because of
slavery's westward expansion across the continent. But these workers hoped only to
contain southern forms of American expansion. Anti-slavery agitators opposed slavery
because it degraded free labor and forced virtuous free labor to compete with
slaveholding southern whites for western lands.
By and large, however, Boston's Yankee workers seemed more interested in
promoting federal and state policies that fostered and protected American commerce and
manufacturing than in supporting and subsidizing territorial acquisition in the West and
South. Boston's working class never mounted serious opposition to the expansion and
reproduction of a northern polity and economy riven with class, racial and gender
divisions in western lands that had already been claimed by other populations, cultures
and states. And they often believed themselves to be stakeholders and beneficiaries of the
westward expansion of a northern free labor society. "An empire," historian Charles S.
Maier notes, 'Is not just a state that subjugates other peoples or states....
It is a system of rule that transforms society at home even as it stabilizes
inequality transnationally by replicating it geographically, in the core and on the
periphery. In return it promises to make even the materially disadvantaged in the
core stakeholders, often enthusiastic ones, in the imperial project. It enlarges
territory or decisive influence to ensure its own new political order, and then it
must defend the contested boundaries it has extended to avoid discrediting the
expansion previously attained."
31
Boston's white male workers exhibited an acute consciousness of their
stakeholder status in the American empire, but they did so primarily in political terms. As
citizens of an expanding New World republic, Yankee workers celebrated the
31
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workingman's franchise and availed themselves of precious opportunities for
participating in local, state and federal elections-precious if only because they understood
that workers in England, France and other European societies lacked the ballot. But the
Yankee ballot box was not the coffin of class consciousness, as some historians have
maintained. 32 Workers' support for the Democratic-Republicans, Whigs, Democrats and
later the Liberty, Free Soil, American and Republican parties was always accented with
considerable consciousness of class identity and class difference. The antebellum period
also witnessed a plethora of third parties, through which dissatisfied workers created
cross-class alliances with members of a growing and increasingly self-conscious middle
class, and sought (and sometimes won) meaningful social and political reforms. 3 "1
Undeniably, differences based on race and ethnicity, gender, and religious
affiliation often blunted or inflated the significance of class in local politics. But Boston's
workers believed that their ability to produce wealth through free labor in an expansionist
New World republic endowed them with a special kind of virtue absent in the non-
producing classes. As the liberal values and institutions of the market revolution
gradually eroded the vestiges of republicanism, working-class political culture was
challenged by an expansionist political economy that often displayed anti-republican
attributes and outcomes.
In the 1790s and the following two decades of Jeffersonian rule, Boston's workers
exhibited an increasingly class-conscious national and internationalist republicanism.
Boston's workers celebrated the benefits and sometimes opposed the costs of citizenship
in an expansionist American republic in a variety of ways. As citizens of a virtuous
32 Alan Dawley, Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn (Cambridge, 2000).
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republican nation, artisans and tradesmen of the Bay State capital participated in a
number of public rituals of nationhood. Although important to the reproduction of a
national political culture, the parades, festivals and other ritual collective forms of
activity are meaningful because of their political cultural content. 34
At times, working-class republicanism in Boston in the early Republic was more
than nationalist: it was internationalist and inclusive. Artisans and laborers dominated the
demonstrations of January 24, 1793, the largest public political event in Boston of the
decade, in which the entire city celebrated the French revolutionary republic's victory
over the Prussian army at Valmy. Yet, this event reflected the development of
partisanship partially based in the differing emergent class cultures. Organized by local
Democratic-Republican leaders who invited men from "all classes and persons without
discrimination" and promised that social rank would be "abolished by the title of
Citizens," seven hundred of Boston's citizens paraded behind French and American flags.
The event marked the first parade route through both the northern and southern working-
class neighborhoods of Boston.
35
The manifestation displayed other unmistakably anti-Federalist features, including
a disruption of the racialized and gendered norms of white male republican citizenship,
when women and black spectators spontaneously joined the pro-French procession at the
rear. Federalists recoiled at these cultural transgressions, in which black seamen joined
white seamen to foist a liberty pole and the "cit" joined the "chess," all without
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demonstrating proper deference for local elites and their social norms. 36 The divisions
within Boston between Federalist elites and growing numbers of pro-Democratic-
Republican artisans only increased during the Jay Treaty crisis. Boston artisans,
dependent on commerce and now forced to compete on unfavorable terms with British
imports, protested the treaty's consequences for trade and its failure to stop the British
navy's marauding press gangs. 37
But the Jeffersonian period marked not only the rejection of social deference by
artisans antipathetic to Old World and New World aristocracy. These years also
witnessed a degree of artisan participation in politics that made citizenship in a
republican empire meaningful. Although property requirements for voting existed well
into the nineteenth century and clearly excluded some white men in Massachusetts towns,
the vast majority were included in the franchise. In 1784 and 1792, Boston's artisans
and laborers rallied to defend the town meetings in which they had participated against
proposals to establish a municipal city government.
39
During the Jefferson and Madison
administrations, many Bay State workers swung solidly behind Federalists in their
opposition to the Embargo and War of 1812 as policies injurious to domestic
manufactures, and many Boston workers supported the anti-southern, anti-expansionist
pronouncements of their local Federalist senator and tribune, Josiah Quincy. No matter
their political loyalties, Boston's white male workers took advantage of the franchise for
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brief periods before the rise of the mass parties in the 1830s and 1840s. During the
embargo crisis and the war of 1812, many Boston artisans, soon thereafter named "the
middling interest," participated in local, state and federal elections.40
Declining voter participation in the late 1810s and throughout the 1820s,
however, did not represent a lack of political activity. Rather, non-elite political activity
took the form of social movements. Republican artisans and other non-elite Federalists of
the middling interest pressured the city and state to move representational elections from
Fanueil Hall to the ward level, and repealed a law banning construction of easily
combustible and cheap "ten-footer" housing typical of artisans' homes. 41 The debtors'
crises that followed the 1819 panic, a rather difficult issue for local Federalist elites, also
caused considerable agitation among Boston's poor, laborers and artisans.
Boston workers also launched petition campaigns for an end to mandatory militia
duty. Although the militias had been cross-class institutions through which local elites
had recruited political supporters, the popularity of mandatory militia service waned
during the highly unpopular embargo and war. Massachusetts males were forced to pay
for their arms and equipment, obey commands from elite officers, and spend time away
from precious work. On the other hand, clergy, doctors, schoolmasters, students, and
public servants enjoyed exemption from militia duty and the high fees others were
required to secure exemption.
42
"[T]he laborer, whose daily tasks suppl[y] but a pitiful
morsel for the support of his family, is called upon for the same sum as the nabob who is
40
Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture.
41
Ibid., 181-187.
42 Matthew H. Crocker, The Magic of the Many: Josiah Quincy and the Rise ofMass Politics,
1800-1830
(Amherst, 1999), 24-28.
42
worth millions]/' cried Joseph Buckingham, printer and publisher of Boston's Galaxy.
"He is driven from his employment, and trained to the use of arms [and] for the defence
of what? Of nothing that he can call his own-of the palace and treasures of his rich
neighbor."43
Josiah Quincy, by now somewhat independent from his Federalist allies, also
appealed to the anti-militia clamors of Boston's laboring base. In an 1820 speech to the
Massachusetts Peace Society, Quincy worried that poverty and the militarism engendered
by the militia laws would compel unending war. Why should the poor not go to war,
Quincy asked, when they "go... to war beggars, [and] return from it nabobs." The
entrenched militia system made war "no longer... a matter of blood, but a matter of
business."
44
In 1823, Quincy rode a cresting wave of insurgent populism into the mayor's
office. For the next five and a half years he served as tribune of Boston's burgeoning
middling interest, and nag to Boston's old Federalist elite. According to one historian.
Quincy' s term marked three decades, beginning in 1800, in which "ordinary Bostonians
shook off the established political culture, forced further democratization, weathered a
populist Caesarist, and in the end established an advanced and more inclusive
4 5democracy."
Nevertheless, as the market revolution penetrated and revolutionized the old
social system and political economy, Boston's political culture became increasingly
bifurcated along lines of class and culture. Emerging from the anti-elitist currents of the
anti-masonry ferment and Jacksonian National Republican party, the Workingmen's
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movement and Workingmen's party in 1830's Boston signified the end of a Yankee
society based on social and political deference. In August, 1830, following an
unsuccessful strike by carpenters and masons, local mechanics met in Julien Hall and
declared support for various reforms that included an end to debt imprisonment and
monopolies, liberal and more diffuse education, the elimination of religion from politics,
and militia reforms.
The political factions that supported Workingmen's candidates (who themselves
were often not artisans or mechanics but local men from the growing middle class) were
only partially related to the much larger labor reform movements in Boston and
throughout the Bay State's industrial centers. These men and women agitated tirelessly
for a ten-hour working day, a call that continued to reverberate well into the 1840s,
especially in cities like Lowell and Lynn. In 1834, workers formed the Boston Trades
Union, central body of sixteen different craft unions, to coordinate strike activity and
reform efforts. On July 4, the BTU organized an autonomous Independence Day parade
of two thousand union members. In July, 1835, Boston's journeymen carpenters
attempted a strike against local masters and merchants for a ten-hour workday, the third
such strike in eight years.
46
Seth Luther, an early labor organizer and radical, expressed
the working-class republicanism of the movement when he wrote that the carpenters
believed that "no man or body of men who require such excessive labor can be friends to
the country or the Rights of Man. We also say, that we have rights, and we have duties to
perform as American Citizens. . .which forbid us to dispose of more than Ten Hours for a
day's work."
47 Republican citizenship could further social reforms but did not alone
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guarantee these workers victory. The strike was crushed by employer opposition, and
Boston labor protest dissolved in the wake of the 1837 depression.
[f the market revolution challenged the economic foundations of Boston workers'
sense of republican citizenship, immigration also challenged its racial and ethnic
dimensions. Although the city's small population of German and other central Europeans
in the antebellum period seemed to cause little havoc, the presence of thousands of Irish
Catholics who migrated to escape the ravages of British colonialism visited considerable
strain on Boston's social and cultural order. The destruction of Charlestown's Ursuline
Convent in 1834 is perhaps only the most extreme event indicating the resentment
encountered by the Irish. These resentments, furthered by the massive immigration
provoked by the potato famine, politically crystallized in the nativism of the American
Party (the "Know-Nothings") and in elements of the new Massachusetts Republican
Party after its founding in 1854. But Irish community leaders managed to win a modicum
of power through the Democratic Party and through their own educational and religious
institutions.'
8
But the interrelated questions of slavery and westward expansion struck at
the very heart of Boston's working-class political culture of republican citizenship.
There is some evidence to suggest that Boston's workers joined middle-class
reformers and Yankee elites in opposing the United States' invasion of Mexico in 1846.
It should be remembered that Massachusetts Senator John Davis cast one of two negative
votes against the war. Governor George Briggs granted commissions only to those
officers who agreed not to serve outside of the commonwealth, and the state legislature
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urged the Christian and patriotic citizens of Massachusetts to actively oppose the war.49
Middle-class anti-slavery activists like Theodore Parker also agitated against the invasion
as an anti-republican scheme of the slave power, often at great bodily risk (Parker was
nearly bayoneted in Fanueil Hall by nearby soldiers), even though he and other anti-war
figures considered the Mexicans to be a race unworthy of joining the northern republic. 50
Even those assembled at a New England Working People's Association meeting in Lynn
in January, 1846, denounced the Mexican war for extending slavery, the first recorded
instance of an anti-slavery position in any labor organization in the United States. 51
Yet, the NEWA's anti-war position statement did not represent the views of all
Massachusetts workers. Working-class popular culture of the period was inundated with
images and representations easily reconcilable with elite notions of manifest destiny. 52
Irish working-class immigrants in particular seized enlistment as an opportunity to prove
their loyalty to their adopted nation, and hoped to prove their capacities for citizenship in
an expansionist republic through military service. Significantly, workers and farmers
throughout the state supported the National Reform movement of George Henry Evans
and other land reformers who sought to prevent slaveholders and non-producing
speculators from securing western lands at the expense of free-labor homesteaders and
producers.
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Indeed, the ideology of the Republican Party, whose leadership would lead the
North into a civil war, found root in a social base of white free-laborers committed to
containing slavery's westward advance. In Massachusetts, working-class nativist support
for the Republicans waxed and waned quickly with the infamous dispute over the two-
year naturalization law controversy in the late 1850s, and the question of slavery quickly
returned to the center of state politics. Although the largely middle-class organizers of the
Liberty and Free Soil parties were instrumental in winning local and state civil rights for
Bay State African-Americans, it should be noted that workers and trades unionists were
also part of the political wing of the anti-slavery movement that formed the factions and
third-party coalitions that preceded the Republican Party. Massachusetts whites of all
classes within the anti-slavery camp ranged in their racial views from a soft paternalism
to a rigid, exclusionist racism.
54
Nevertheless, the history of Massachusetts and Boston
do not seem to vindicate the conclusions of historians who have recently contended that
northern working-class "whiteness" functioned as the primary obstacle to working class
solidarity.
55
The experience of the Civil War reinforced a cross-class regional and national
identity. Even while wartime policies and hardships exposed the widening class divide
between a growing class of wage-earners and industrial and financial elites, the war
served as a crucible of working-class nationalism crucial to the military and political
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strength of an expansionist federal government. 56 Nevertheless, as the conditions for
rapid capitalist industrialization created by the Civil War triggered explosive social strife
in the Gilded Age, it became increasingly clear to both workers and elites that the United
States had become something other than the nation of small-scale and independent
republican producers which so many artisan revolutionaries had hoped to establish a
century ago.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW EMPIRE: CONTENDING CLASSES AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN GILDED AGE BOSTON
"The masters of industry, who control interests which represent billions of
dollars, do not admit that they have broken with pioneer ideals. They regard
themselves as pioneers under changed conditions, carrying on the old work of
developing the natural resources of the nation....
Two ideals were fundamental in traditional American thought, ideals that
developed in the pioneer era. One was that of individual freedom to compete
unrestrictedly for the resources of a continent-the squatter ideal. To the pioneer
government was an evil. The other was the ideal of democracy-"government of
the people, by the people, and for the people." The operation of these ideals took
place contemporaneously with the passing into private possession of the free
public domain and the natural resources of the United States. But American
democracy was based on abundance of free lands; these were the very conditions
that shaped its growth and its fundamental traits. Thus time has revealed that these
two ideals of pioneer democracy had elements of mutual hostility and contained
the seeds of its dissolution." 1
The great and often violent social transformation of America in the thirty-five
years after the Civil War also contributed to the transformation of working-class political
culture. Many workers, especially northern white and Protestant Anglo-Saxon workers,
had long maintained a virile identification with the republicanism of the Revolution and
its traditional values of manly virtue and independence. Yet, the liberal restructuring of
the American economy and political economy eroded the republican roots of nineteenth
century northern working-class political culture.
Industrial workers responded to the expansionist, monopoly capitalist economy
and political economy of the age with their own popular conceptions of political
economy. Sometimes joined by farmers and middle-class allies, industrial workers
1
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pressured the Republican and Democratic parties, formed their own independent local,
state, and national parties, and organized trade unions and radical associations in order to
assert and implement their alternative vision. Their response to the chronic recessions and
depressions of the 1880's and 1890's spread panic within the exclusive circles of elite
political and economic decision-makers. Elite reaction to social and political crisis in turn
inexorably contributed to the United States' intervention in an inter-imperial conflict to
its south in the Caribbean, and to the west, in the Pacific, and the creation of a
qualitatively new kind of American empire.
Cultural historians of America have recently stressed the continuity of empire
throughout the history of the United States, from its colonial beginnings as an assortment
of British trading and religious settlements to more recent interventions in the Middle
East. Although claims for continuity focuses our attention upon trends of imperial
expansion and a pervasive culture of empire too often neglected by dominant narratives,
the historical record substantiates claims for continuity almost entirely in terms of culture
and cultural representations. Because cultural histories of empire often ignore questions
of class and social structure, such considerations hardly enter calculations of continuity or
discontinuity in American empire. Nevertheless, the lived experience of individuals in a
society divided not only by culture, race, and gender, but also class, shaped the ways in
which individuals and groups viewed questions of empire and expansion, nation and
citizenship, and their relation to the political economy as a whole.
If one analyzes the history of American empire not merely as a cultural
phenomenon but also as a relationship between class, foreign policy, and politics and
political economy, the history of American empire seems quite different. From a
50
"bottom-up" social perspective, U.S. acquisition of Hawaii and domination of Cuba and
the Philippines constitutes a significant departure in American history. This departure is
not merely a matter of the creation of a modern military and administrative state, nor is it
defined only by greater U.S. integration in world labor and export markets. 2 No longer
able to rely on ample western lands to preserve their republican independence, manliness,
and virtue, workers faced an expansionist foreign policy and political economy which, it
was alleged, no longer provided homestead acres for free labor and free farmers, but open
markets for American exports and the exploitation of precious raw materials overseas.
While some industrialists, financiers, and farmers supported overseas economic and
political expansion as a means to settling the simmering social, economic and political
crises gripping the country in the 1890s, many workers and trade unionists detected
private-minded motives lurking behind a new kind of overseas, militarized American
expansion, and worried that it threatened their traditional republican notions of
citizenship. Many in the labor movement also feared that the new empire would unleash
waves of immigration, thereby introducing fatally competitive cheap labor that lowered
living standards unfit for white republican workers and their families.
However, a few individuals within the working-class movement, including
Morrison I. Swift, began to express a critique of American society that posited a
qualitatively new and different form of citizenship and political economy. The alternative
economy, society and polity they envisioned for America de-linked production,
consumption and prosperity from expansion and empire. Before workers and working-
class organizers and intellectuals criticized American empire at the end of the century,
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however, they first offered an alternative vision of American economic and political life
that, at its very center, emphasized an egalitarian redistribution of wealth and political
power-a way of life requiring not the further acquisition of territories and their precious
resources, but the reorganization of production, consumption and distribution, and the
polity.
MORRISON I. SWIFT AND THE PROBLEMS OF A NEW LIFE
If Morrison Isaac Swift became one of the first American radicals to identify and
critique an American political economy of empire, his origins seemed to prepare him for
a less unorthodox legacy. Born in the Midwest, Swift was raised in the traditional culture
of New England, and his migration to Boston in 1890 virtually represents the return of a
prodigal son of Yankeedom. 3
His parents had named Swift after a paternal grandfather, Isaac, born in 1790 in
Connecticut and fathered by a revolutionary war veteran and doctor. Thrust into the
world by his parents' early death, Isaac Swift studied medicine in New York before he
emigrated westward. Finally settling in Ravenna, Ohio, he married, started a successful
practice, opened the town's first drug store, and quickly became a prominent member of
the community. He organized the First Congregational Church, became county treasurer,
and was appointed to an associate judgeship. His son Charles, father to Morrison, also
became a doctor. Isaac Swift's other son, Henry, adopted his father's political interests,
but died tragically a few months after being elected governor of Minnesota in the late
1850's
4
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While Morrison did not initially seem to share his family's vocation in business,
politics or religion, he certainly thrived in school. His parents, Charles and Emily Folger,
married in 1851. After living for a time on Nantucket Island in Massachusetts, they
moved to Ravenna, where Morrison was born in 1856, and later to Ashtabula, Ohio. High
school prepared young Morrison for college and, in 1875, he enrolled at Western Reserve
College (now Case Western). In 1877, for reasons unknown. Swift transferred to
Williams College, a small liberal arts institution in western Massachusetts. There he
launched an academic career of considerable promise. Swift consistently maintained a
high rank, and the college president at the time remembered him as an earnest, diligent
and faithful student. His peers recalled his talents as an eloquent and persuasive speaker
and leader in clubs and fraternities. In his final year at Williams, Swift edited the student
newspaper and delivered a commencement address. Although his Williams colleagues
remembered him as an ardent Congregationalist, idealist, and Republican supporter of
free-trade economics, his later education, both on and off campus, moved young
Morrison in another direction. 5
By all indications, Swift might have secured a professorial position in one of
America's elite universities. In 1879, he began studies for a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins
University; in his first year he studied Greek poetry and philosophy. In 1880, Swift
completed an essay on the ethics of Herbert Spencer and Immanuel Kant which earned
him a fellowship. Now tutored by scholars including philosopher Charles Santiago Pierce
and historian Herbert Baxter Adams, Swift soon took interest in philosophy's relevance
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to contemporary society. Adams' social-biological "Teutonic germ theory" of American
political development, in which he argued that American liberalism and democracy had
sprouted from an English (and earlier German) seed planted in New England, must have
influenced Swift greatly, as we will later see. Although he briefly taught philosophy at
Hobart College, Swift returned to Johns Hopkins, which in 1885 awarded a Ph.D. for a
dissertation on "The Ethics of Idealism, as Represented by Hegel and Aristotle." For the
next year Swift continued his studies at the University of Berlin, but returned to America
in 1886.
6
Swift now began a journey that ultimately led him to spurn life in the academy for
the privations of the American urban poor and the working-class. As a young middle-
class intellectual and social worker in various cities in the urban industrial northeast.
Swift plunged into the ferment of radical Gilded Age social reform. Yet, Swift's
experience with urban middle-class reform clearly troubled his expanding radical
sensibilities.
In his first four years of settlement work, Swift committed himself to uniting
middle-class and working-class reformers through educational programs in poor and
working-class neighborhoods. In the winter of 1887 and 1888, he worked for a settlement
house in Philadelphia and collaborated with Adams in efforts to introduce into American
settlements the university extension practices of English working-class educational
reformers. In 1889, he moved to New York's Lower East Side to live and work in the
first settlement house in the United States, the Neighborhood Guild, founded by Stanton
Coit, an Amherst College graduate who learned the English model while in residence at
6
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Toynbee Hall. In 1890, Swift returned to Philadelphia and founded a Neighborhood
Guild. Later that year, he moved to Boston for the first time to found the Equity Union,
another progressive settlement house. 8 Swift hoped to improve on older settlement
models by adopting English practices including weekly lectures by professors, students,
and political organizers. Although he conceded that light entertainments and social
occasions were more likely to attract workers exhausted at the end of the day. Swift
seemed most interested in offering a social education to urban workers.
Swift consistently organized an ecumenical lecture series in each of the
settlements where he worked. In New York, his "Social Science Club" hosted an
impressive roster of speakers, although some clearly reflected the middle-class
orientation of his politics. Lawrence Gronlund, author of The Cooperative
Commonwealth, a primer on Marx and socialism published in 1884, reassured his
audience that socialism would not abolish human individuality. Professor Felix Adler of
the Society for Ethical Culture advocated an ethical solution to America's social
problems, and another Professor, Richmond M. Smith of Columbia College, addressed
immigration. Other speakers, including a union printer, lawyers, college students, editors,
and Swift himself, discussed strikes, trusts, settlements, taxation, and anarchism.'' Like
many middle-class reformers of his time, Swift hoped that his urban "social university"
7
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would provide a "middle-ground" for "social fusion" that would dissipate class
distinctions and class consciousness. 10
Yet Swift's frustrations with the settlement approach seethed through the pages of
his writings on these projects. Cleary, his noblesse oblige and cultural elitism remained
an obstacle, despite his obvious sympathy for the oppressed and his disdain for charity.
"The wage class, the masses, may somewhat shock our taste," warned Swift,
"but had they not for generations and centuries devoted themselves to
severe and uncouth lives the higher taste that they shock in us would never have
been developed in us. We owe them something. We owe them an immense, an
unspeakable debt. . . Since the masses have made taste and comfort possible to us.
our debt is to turn and make taste and comfort possible to the masses. . . In
making culture and taste and comfort possible for us they may have sacrificed not
only culture but the power to desire culture. . . In the way least harsh and
offensive we must extend to the masses the comeliness and the desire for
comeliness which in the world's evolution they have been temporarily deprived of
for our sakes.""
Despite this condescension, Swift carefully distinguished the "philanthropy" of
social settlements from religious charities or relief, struggling to define ways in which
middle-class reformers could act in solidarity with workers and the poor. Swift decried
temperance, means-testing, and proselytizing, urging instead conversation, common labor
and friendship between staff and workers. But Swift admitted that this progressive
approach did not always successfully elicit participation and approval or urban workers.
Reflecting on his time in New York, Swift acknowledged that local working-class
leaders regarded experiments like his Social Science Club as programs of the "well-to-
do," "palliatives" which did not address the root cause of inequality. Skilled workers, he
10
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complained, told him "they could accomplish more for the cause at the hearts by
intensifying class feeling."
12
His efforts in Philadelphia seemed quickly reversed when he
established his university extension project in a building owned by the Baldwin
Locomotive Works. Baldwin employees disapproved of such welfarist schemes; Swift
noted they were "prejudiced against it because they regarded it as a charity," and worried
it would force them "to pay in more work or less wages." Nevertheless, Swift affirmed
the value of university extension and praised Baldwin and other firms for their support. 13
Swift later alleged that this project faltered only when wealthy members of the board of
directors interfered with the Guild workers' educational programs, causing them to quit. 11
Swift almost certainly acquired his socialist politics through these middle-class
values and pretensions. Although he hailed his "social university" as a means to "mass
emancipation," Swift first seemed more interested in educational reform as a way to
extend the good life than as a strategy to spread socialist ideas and practice. Indeed. Swift
appeared absolutely naive about possible obstacles to building cross-class alliances. In
1889, in a lecture to the Nationalist club of Oakland, California, Swift appealed to the
middle-class socialists in the audience to reach out to the struggling workers below.
The Nationalists, whose ranks were filled mostly by professionals, the educated,
and, in Boston, military retirees attracted to Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, could
unite with the upper echelons of labor. "I have noticed how certain thrifty workingmen
itch for the condescending approval and friendship of their social superiors," Swift
assured the Oakland Nationalists. "They will not join labor organizations for fear of the
12
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cold shoulder from this quarter and make themselves great impediments to the industrial
emancipation." But Nationalists, he argued, could recruit these workers into the Knights
of Labor and other trade unions. In addition, he urged the Nationalists to investigate
stores and factories with poor working conditions and call boycotts and use other forms
of public pressure to force improvements, anticipating the strategy of organizations like
the National Consumers League. 15 Swift hardly realized that the middle-class and
bureaucratic sort of socialism advocated by the Nationalists and their Fabian cousins in
England had marginal appeal for working men and women whom the Nationalists, he
suggested, should "rescue." 16
Swift carried his reform message beyond the urban middle-class, however. In
1890, he returned to Ashtabula, Ohio, and continued to write and speak to a variety of
audiences. In January, 1891, in the midst of the agrarian crisis then sparking populist
agitation, Swift addressed local Ashtabula farmers. He began by making a startling
observation that struck at the very core of American republican ideals. "It is a mistake of
the American people to think they have departed far from European traditions." Swift
said. "Our revolution freed our purses from English taxation, but it did not free our minds
from English ideas." Aristocracy had planted itself in American soil. Swift maintained.
Plentiful lands that once seemed to assure a rough social equality were exhausted, and
farmers everywhere had become impoverished.
15
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But now Swift seemed to root his socialist beliefs not in fears of class antagonism
or an attempt to bring culture to the working class, but in a labor theory of value that
defined capitalism as a system of organized robbery. The railroads, the trusts, retailers
and banks had all combined to rob the farmer of the wealth produced by his arduous
labors. Swift suggested utilization of the ballot to secure nationalization of transportation,
manufacturing, cooperative stores land and state ownership of banking and credit. These
were the only remedies for the dire situation facing farmers and industrial workers. "It is
a conflict between capitalists and citizens," Swift thundered. "If the capitalists survive the
citizens will not survive, for citizenship is not possible without independence, and
1 "7
combined capital leaves no chance for that."
The once-promising son of society's middle ranks now happily reconciled himself
to the possibility of social revolution and prepared to abandon his class for that of the
workers and poor. Swift the social reformer, who only recently had advocated a gentle
"social fusion" of the classes, now endorsed a violent social war, such as the French
Revolution, as a necessary last resort to enact fundamental social transformation. "There
will be no peace on earth until inequality is abolished, and there should be no peace,"
warned Swift. "If equality must be bought by bloodshed, let us have bloodshed; let us
have riots and rebellions and violent revolutions, if necessary.
nX%
Yet Swift had not
entirely lost hope in independent politics as a means for reform, as his activities in Boston
during the coming depression indicated. Nor did he lose his optimism that the social
question might be settled without wholesale class warfare.
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His first attempt at fiction, The League ofJustice; Or, Is it Right to Rob Robbers?
(1893), signaled a residual faith in a peaceful resolution to America's growing social
divide. Although a convoluted plot and awkward prose marred the story, Swift centered it
around a secret society of clerks who chisel dividends from their employers and distribute
the stolen surplus value to the needy. Although his League protagonists gradually
organize newspapers, cooperatives, schools, and clubs, their detection brings a trial and a
final armed confrontation between the League, worker and farmer supporters, and the
president and his capitalist and banker cohorts. Magically, the vastly outnumbered elite
realize the hopelessness of their cause, capitulate to the masses, and recognize the error of
their ways.
19
Although such a cheeky ending must have invited dismissal from skeptical
readers, The League of Justice marked Swift's abandonment of middle-class social
reform for a politics of social citizenship and redistributive political economy.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE UNEMPLOYED
Between 1891 and 1893, Swift spent fourteen months in England, Switzerland
and Berlin (doing what is unclear), but in 1893, upon returning to Boston and the Equity
Union, he found fertile soil in which to reap the seeds of social discontent." The massive
depression that ensued in the summer of 1893 wreaked havoc on the urban working class
and poor in states across the country, including Massachusetts. The Massachusetts
Bureau of Labor Statistics did not collect unemployment data for 1893, but the data for
the census for the year ending May 1, 1895, indicated severe levels of unemployment that
rivaled those of the Great Depression forty years later. Although only 8 to 10 percent of
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20
Boston Herald, February 21, 1894.
60
Massachusetts' labor force was unemployed at any one time that year, nearly 30 percent
were unemployed, for an average of more than three months, during that census year. The
frequency of unemployment was undoubtedly even higher in late 1893 and early 1894. In
1895, Boston's building trades workers still reported extraordinary levels of
unemployment. That year in the city, 36 percent of carpenters, 55 percent of brick
masons and 44 percent of stone masons, and 45 percent of house painters experienced
joblessness for an average of four months. 21 These workers, many of whom were already
members of AFL craft unions, probably fared better than most unorganized workers.
Witnessing the specter of deprivation and misery daily on the streets outside the
Oak Street offices of the Equity Union, Swift sought to instruct Boston's unemployed
workers on the cause of their condition. A pamphlet published on New Year's Day, 1894,
suggested that a grossly unequal distribution of wealth was the cause of the
unemployment. Swift assured his readers that even Edward Atkinson, an eccentric
advocate of free trade and dietary reform, inventor and innovator in industrial insurance,
and Boston's most well-known political economist, claimed that America had never been
wealthier. Swift, however, held individual capitalists responsible for the plight of the
jobless. The wealthy and manufacturers had squandered an opportunity to provide work.
They therefore lost any original social rights to their wealth and the means of production.
"Ownership," Swift declared, "is abrogated."
22
Such a dire situation demanded an alternative political economy, in which
American citizens assumed social rights to own and operate the nation's farms and
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factories. Every American citizen, Swift asserted, had a right to employment. 23 "Who are
you," he asked the factory owner, "to decree like the Shah, or Czar, or Almighty l urk,
that the children of millions of solid respectable American citizens shall go shivering
though this winter planting consumption in their chests?" Fundamental rights to
employment had been denied twice, only to be gained and regained in the American
Revolution and the Civil War. But the late depression forever vitiated any claims the free
labor doctrine made on defining economic and social realities. "If a man is not free to
labor when he wants to" Swift suggested emphatically, "there is no freedom oflabor!"
24
Swift also condemned the Associated Charities and other relief organizations for failing
to provide food, clothing and shelter to the majority of Boston's unemployed workers and
their families. He instead advocated road construction and repair, the construction of
public housing and parks, and state farms. Indeed, the intense deprivation of the first
"great depression" had caused Swift to root his social ideals in a concrete interest in
political economy. Swift's capacious social notion of citizenship and his proposals for
public relief policies vividly illustrated the alternative social system he envisioned for
Boston and America.
Whether or not all of Boston's unemployed agreed with every aspect of his
political program, Swift consistently attracted a significant number of the city's jobless to
a series of political demonstrations throughout the spring of 1894. In word and deed,
Swift developed a symbolically potent repertoire of collective action in order to illustrate
23
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the plight of the unemployed and to make social demands of citizenship upon the state
and federal governments.25 The protests of Boston's unemployed focused workers"
attention and activity towards a political economy based not an expanding polity or
commercial system but on a fundamental redistribution of wealth and power.
The first demonstration, evidently sponsored by Swift and his colleagues at the
Equity Union, and held on Boston Common in the early afternoon of February 6, closely
followed the themes of Swift's pamphlet. Between 1,000 and 2,000 unemployed men
(and a few women) including native-born workers but also numerous Italians, Jewish
garment workers, and Irish immigrants, first listened to Swift. He endorsed government
relief policies recently instituted in Belgium, and urged the audience to form a delegation
to wait upon the state legislature and force them to enact similar measures. "It is time that
citizens should lay down their absurd respectability, so called," said Swift, "and demand
their rights if they are starving." Patrick F. O'Neil, a prominent member of the Boston
local of the Socialist Labor Party, condemned the Republican and Democratic parties, to
great applause. The Methodist Reverend Herbert N. Casson, also of the Equity Union,
condemned charities for spying into workers' privacy before distributing relief. "I should
advise that the workers put spies on the rich and find out how they obtained their wealth
and how they live," Casson remarked. "Mrs. Merrifield" urged "obliteration of race
prejudice in the common fight against capital," and James F. Carey, a shoe worker from
Haverhill, former Populist and state SLP leader, also spoke. Swift, who apparently had
sent a letter to Massachusetts Governor Frederick T. Greenhalge urging relief, read his
reply, in which Greenhalge remonstrated that all municipal relief employment "should be
25
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so administered as to disturb as slightly as possible the conditions of the labor market in
general, with the hope that more work may be forthcoming in the natural and regular
way." Then, led by three high school boys with fife and drum, the assembled marched
past City Hall, the State House, and down Beacon Street and Commonwealth Avenue
through Boston's best neighborhoods, before returning to the Commons and
disbanding. 26
Swift and his SLP colleagues continued to organize more protests at the
Commons, despite the vicissitudes of winter weather. On February 13, the 250
unemployed in attendance approved a resolution urging the legislature to adopt a
constitutional amendment recognizing a right to employment and mandating its provision
by the state. The gathering marched to the State House to see the governor, whose
absence prompted them to briefly visit the House and Senate galleries. After talking to
two state legislators, Swift led the delegation back to the Commons, denounced the
legislature as "the representatives of the capitalists and the monopolists," and dissolved
the meeting.
27
The agitation seemed to climax on February 20, when 2,500 assembled on the
Commons for another march on the State House. Only Swift and Casson entered, but this
time they returned with Governor Greenhalge, who nervously urged the crowd first to
follow the law. He informed them that the state would provide work only if necessary,
beneficial, and fundable, but promised to do whatever legally possible to create jobs.
After the governor returned to his chambers, Swift, now armed with a petition with the
26
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usual demands for the House of Representatives, led the throng into Doric Hall. "We are
going to present our petition to the House, and if the suggestions contained in the
Governor's speech are not carried out," Swift threatened, "we'll clean out every man in
the Legislature." This statement caused considerable consternation, and the Governor,
now quite irate, demanded that Swift clarify that he meant "by the ballot." At this, 50
police forced the crowd out of the building. Swift attempted to speak from the Grand
Army of the Republic monument on the Commons, but forced off by the police, he
addressed the jobless from the crotch of an elm. One reporter thought the crowd consisted
mostly of Armenians, Polish, and Russian Jews, although he also spotted a few African-
Americans, Irish and Germans. "We found out one thing this afternoon," declared Swift.
"It is that an employed workman is a part of the stale, but that an unemployed man is not.
When you lose a situation and don't know where you can gel something lo eat, then you
lose your citizenship in the United States." But this time the protests seemed to have
succeeded; a few friendly representatives persuaded the House lo refer their petition lo a
i»i 28
special committee of seven legislators.
For Swift, the event obviously was a high point in his long career as a political
organizer and agitator. He fictionalized the confrontation in a novel transparently
modeled after Joseph Conrad's Heart ofDarkness. The Horroboos is narrated by a retired
American adventurer. Colonel Fessenden Brady, who, aboard a European ocean-liner,
recounts his long-ago journey into Africa as a missionary. In the course of his story.
Colonel Brady is captured by a savage tribe, but manages to win the favor of his captors
and begins to introduce Western civilization, namely capitalism and Christianity, to the
African "Rinyo" culture. Brady soon finds himself the puppeteer behind the Rinyo king.
" BG, March 21, 1894.
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When the King one day suddenly informs him that a gigantic leviathan is approaching the
palace, Brady realizes that the beast is actually "a compact body of emaciated men.
"who sustained themselves on their feet by leaning together in a mass, the
tottering weight of one side of the group propping up the other side, as two men
tipping with drink support themselves by embracing each other when either alone
would fall. Not much but bones and facial expressions remained of these wasted
beings, while as to strength they retained none, or barely enough to stagger slowly
forward. In number they were about four hundred and fifty altogether.
'Have they smallpox, cholera, or what, that they frighten everybody so?' 1
demanded, hoping the King might have recovered the power of a few syllables
from his general paralysis.
'Far worse,' twitched he, his sublime teeth masticating themselves with
the force of a mill, "it is Hunger! They are the superfluous population you cast
out, returning for vengeance.
"
The King, obviously representing Governor Greenhalge, begs Brady to meet the
mob, but Brady reassures his subordinate:
'Calm your fears, dry your tears, receive these dying emaciants with the
mien of a sovereign, and try your best to hide from them and the populace that
you are in mortal fear for your life. Quake as it were haughtily to deceive them."
'Oh! Oh!' wailed His Sublimity, 'go down and meet them for me, you
have the armor of a thousand theories in your breast and I am naked."
"No my dear boy,' I answered, 'we must use finesse. The time has come
for stratagem, and I will stand behind you with all the theories named. Listen to
my instructions. Receive them with deep sympathy, assure them that you feel for
them, promise all the help in your power, declare with blinks of sorrow that you
will carefully examine the laws on the subject of allowing surplus men to eat
surplus food, point out with gulps of woe that the Rinyo Constitution stands in
the way of your doing anything for them that you do not want to do, and that our
Congress of Ancient Quacks prohibits everything else; be solemn, majestic and
slippery: then come away and we will kill them off one by one by delays. The
imbecile multitude will think we mean what we say'...."
29
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Swift clearly felt that his efforts had been deflected by clever politicians. But the
protests, defended by Swift as "town meetings/ , continued through April, and encouraged
state legislators to immediately generate limited employment by funding more public
works projects. 30 The House committee which received the petition formed a three-
member Board to Investigate the Subject of the Unemployed, but their report, released
the next year, recommended little other than expanded public works programs even
though it was unprecedented in its acknowledgement of unemployment as a permanent
policy concern for state government.
31
The House committee and the Board also held
hearings. In Boston, AFL representatives advocated direct, non-contract state
employment at union rates through state ownership of railroads and increased public
works. But the AFL men refused to endorse the state farms, labor colonies or factories of
Swift's petitions. At several Boston Central Labor Union meetings Swift and Casson
successfully garnered support from many local unions with unemployed members, and a
majority of delegates at a March CLU meeting even seemed to favor Swift's proposed
socialist policies. But union leaders were reluctant to embrace measures that could be
construed as socialist in nature.
furthermore, while unions that probably contained large numbers of immigrant
workers, including the Street Laborers union, felt that citizens should be allowed public
employment on relief work, the majority of delegates to Boston's Building Trades union
council approved a resolution to the mayor to restrict city employment to citizens. A
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similar resolution in the Boston CLU met considerable opposition from the United
Garment Workers, the Furniture Workers, and the Cigar Makers. 33 Even the relatively
conservative Frank K. Foster, editor of the Massachusetts AFL's official weekly. The
Labor Leader, argued that the proposed citizenship requirement improperly elevated "the
political duties of union members above their economic duties," a reversal which would
"belittle and emasculate the organization."34 Nevertheless, Foster opposed Swift's
proposal for state farms, lest they overwhelm the state treasury by attracting an inordinate
amount of immigrant workers from poorer nations. 35 Though elite Bostonians afraid of
the foreign dilution of Anglo-Saxon culture were busily organizing the Immigration
Restriction League, many Boston workers viewed immigrants primarily as an economic
threat in moments of extreme economic distress. 36 This was not so different from many
Massachusetts workers in previous decades who had denounced the drastic competition
introduced by immigrant workers' wages, but who had also denounced both the
employers and contractors who determined these wages and the un-American values of
legislative exclusionism in the 1880s.
37
Nevertheless, Swift's spirited demonstrations caught the eye of AFL President
Samuel Gompers, who appeared at a March 20 mass meeting in Fanueil Hall alongside
Swift and exclaimed to great applause, "If you are true to Mr. Swift, you will be true to
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the labor movement."38 In the meantime, Boston unionists generally displayed
considerable support for independent local, state and national political efforts. In early
April, city unionists of both the AFL and the residue of the Knights of Labor adopted an
independent political platform for upcoming city elections based on abolition of contract
labor, municipal ownership of the railroad and gas and electric works, and female
suffrage.
39
In June of 1894, Boston-area unionists also convened a political convention
for Massachusetts trade unionists to organize an independent party. These movements
echoed the popular agitation behind the socialist-led "Political Program," a program that
notably included state ownership of the means of production and had been approved by
the 1893 AFL convention. (Eventually opposed by Gompers and his supporters, the
program was finally voted down in late 1894). 40 Yet, for a time, it seemed that organized
labor, the political left, and the unemployed had found a common ground which
competition for scarce jobs had in the past prevented.
Public interest in the cause of the unemployed grew when Swift and the Hquity
Union decided to organize an independent delegation to join Coxey's Army at
Washington, D.C. On April 22, nearly 25,000 people assembled on the Commons to
observe the departure of the "New England Industrial Delegation." Though Swift clearly
found the military character of the march distasteful-the several dozen unemployed men
in the delegation marched from Boston to New Haven in columns of four abreast, with
captains leading them-he joined the marchers to make speeches and organize supplies at
several points along the way. While the marchers met some opposition from frightened
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local authorities, they, much like the movement led by Jacob Coxey, invoked popular
notions of citizenship and Americanism and strained to appear patriotic, carrying an
American flag from the Civil War. Sons of Union Veterans militiamen in Wakefield,
Rhode Island, refused to eject the delegation from their town when asked to do so by
town selectmen. 41 Despite their constant disavowal of violent intentions. Swift and the
unemployed of the movement he helped to organize clearly caused great consternation
among a middle and upper class frightened by infectious social and political unrest.
This fear extended to those in Washington, D.C., in control of decision-making in
foreign policy. Many viewed overproduction as the primary culprit behind the current
economic calamity, and urged as a remedy an increase in trade and the opening of foreign
markets. The same month Coxey' s Army arrived in the nation's capital, Secretary of
State Walter Q. Gresham informed acquaintances that "the assembling of bands of men
all over the country" might "portend revolution." Although he opposed the annexation of
Hawaii, Gresham advocated increased and competitive commerce abroad as the surest
path to renewing prosperity at home. 42 Gresham was not alone in his concerns. Boston's
Brooks Adams, whose finances suffered considerably in the 1893 depression, also
expressed anxieties about a possible social revolution, leading him later to advocate
similar expansionist policies.
43
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Although Swift did not share their conclusions, his observations in the next lew
years only verified the trepidation expressed by elites. In 1895, he traveled to California
and surveyed the opinions of bankrupted farmers, agricultural wage workers, and
tramps.
44
Although Swift selectively reported the opinions of his informants, his report
echoed anticipations of social revolt in the agricultural populations of the West. Not even
the verdant fields of California had been spared the intense dissatisfaction sweeping the
Midwest and East. One "observant citizen" of Monterey speculated: "If the rich did in
other countries as they do here there would be a revolution. Our whole social system is a
humbug. You look at the whole nation and you would think it was crazy." A businessman
in San Rafael affirmed, in Swift's words, "the terrible condition of society, and declared
that American people would never submit to be slaves, that they would fight and
overthrow the capitalists." Discussing the presidential race in 1896, a Guernsville man
warned, "If the next election does not win for the people, the social question will be
settled by muscle and bullets. I would have Rothschild put on his bank and blown up. 1 [e
is the worst enemy of man." Threats of violence pervaded Swift's interrogations. "1
despise the rich man," raged a teamster near Forestville. "The only way to help them is to
bore a hole in their heads and let the sap run out, and put some new sap of a better kind in
... We could manage things a good deal better. If things get desperate enough people
n»45rise up.
The great social crisis of the 1 890s had politicized Swift and moved this young
middle-class reformer from sympathy and settlements to socialism and protest. By the
late 1890s, Swift had lost much of the bourgeois condescension he had formerly
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displayed as a young academic-turned urban reformer. A master of sarcasm if nothing
else, Swift now ridiculed the settlements' attempts to introduce refinement and "culture"
to the working class and poor. The creation of a "Pitying Society," Swift urged, might
help society to discover that "the trouble with the poor is not that they are poor, but that
they are without art... Their real wretchedness lies in their lamentable enjoyment of
miserable pictures." If only these workers could realize the "ghastly falseness of their
standards of art," Swift suggested, no matter their poverty, they would "soar to a new
high and satisfied plane of being by going to look in the windows of an art store." Then
Pitying Society staff might organize a free school for poor girls to teach them to be better
domestic servants.46 Swift's rejections of his past as a settlement worker and academic
marked a cultural turn in his politics from charity and elite knowledge to an expansive
culture of social citizenship, even if he maintained a certain middle-class sensibility in his
politics, as we will see in the next chapter.
No less than a pioneer in crafting a specifically American political culture of
social citizenship far more suited to the New Deal period than the 1890s. Swift was one
of the first political radicals to build a mass movement to demand a public right to
employment. In Boston and New England, Swift created a powerful repertoire of
collective action through which to organize the mostly immigrant unemployed and make
claims on local, state and federal government. Swift's belief that even immigrant workers
from southern and eastern Europe had social rights to employment suggests that not all
Americans, including native-born workers themselves, believed in a racialized kind ol
citizenship, but instead primarily rooted their notions of citizenship in political and social
Public Ownership Review, December, 1898.
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rights. In the West, Swift had sought experiences and individuals to confirm his
growing belief in the necessity for a radical redistribution of the nation's wealth and
political power. He was not disappointed. But he could not have anticipated that
American elites would soon attempt to resolve America's social question, though not by
transforming domestic politics, but by crafting and implementing expansionist foreign
policies and an expansionist, capitalist political economy-elite policies that would
eventually help undermine the bases and boundaries of republican working-class political
culture.
47
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CHAPTER 4
THE MODERN MOMENT: POLITICS, WORKERS,
AND THE NEW AMERICAN EMPIRE
"The working men have no country.
.
.
National differences, and antagonisms between peoples, are daily more
and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of
commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in
the conditions of life corresponding thereto ... In proportion as the exploitation
of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by
another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between
classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come
to an end."
1
When George E. McNeill chaired a mass meeting in Boston's Fanueil Hall jointly
organized by the New England Anti-Imperialist League and the city's Central Labor
Union on the evening of January 22, 1902, this experienced labor organizer and working-
class reformer knew how to appeal to his audience. An imposing, bearded man now in his
sixty-sixth year of life, the venerable McNeill was a living embodiment of the
producerist, republican political culture that had long infused Boston's working and
middling classes.
A textile worker and shoemaker, McNeill had led labor protests since the age of
14, when he was fired from a woolen factory for leading a six-month strike to defend a
twenty-minute lunch break. A former abolitionist crusade, McNeill after the Civil War
became a pioneering leader in the movement for eight-hour legislation. In 1 869, he was
appointed the Deputy Secretary of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor,
the
1
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first of its kind in the United States. He also led the International Labor Union, the
precursor national organization to the American Federation of Labor, and the local
Knights of Labor district assembly in Boston in the mid- 1880s. In the 1890's, McNeill
joined the Social Gospelers and openly supported Irish nationalist and Russian radical
movements. 2 McNeill's personality and politics was woven whole cloth from Yankee
working-class culture, and The Labor Movement: The Problem of To-day, published in
1886 and edited by McNeill, captured the views of the most militant Yankee workers.
"We declare," announced McNeill in its pages, "that there is an inevitable and irresistible
conflict between the wage-system of labor and the republican system of government." 3
Now, in 1902, McNeill joined Samuel Gompers and others who had assailed the
cheap labor a new U.S. empire threatened to introduce to the New World republic. But
McNeill also reminded his audience of the costs of American empire in Asia. "Wealth is
not as rapidly increased by killing Filipinos as by making shoes," McNeill suggested. If
American expansion in the Pacific Rim was intended to find markets for the goods
produced by America's industrial workers, as its boosters argued, McNeill replied that
"Every Filipino killed means one consumer less." And he appropriated the economic
discourse of the day in order to spear his opponents. "We favor a high protective tariff on
human blood, and free trade in liberty."
Most importantly, McNeill invoked the heritage of the Revolution in constructing
his republican, working-class version of Americanism. "Self-government produces men
fit for self-government, but a government over a people will end in the overthrow of the
2
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government by the people, or reduce the people to a condition of vassalage," McNeill
warned. "If we withhold the right of self-government from any people we invite the
withholding of self-government from ourselves." He appealed to the sympathies of Irish
workers in the audience by suggesting that Filipino workers, irrespective of skin color,
enjoyed the same political rights as they. "The old song, 'They are hanging men and
women there for the wearing of the Green,' can be changed to 'They are hanging
Filipinos for wearing their own colors.'" McNeill sharply castigated those who equated
dissent with disloyalty, intoning, "It is not yet treason to give three cheers for Samuel
Adams in Fanueil Hall."4
As the United States' bloody occupation of the Philippines extended into the first
decade of the twentieth century, and as the patriotic fervor inspired by the Cuban war
subsided, many labor leaders, trade unionists and workers in the United States joined
McNeill in opposition to militarized overseas U.S. expansion. This abomination of a new
and modern American empire is an important marker in the long history of U.S. working-
class political culture. For the first time in American history, a significant number of
working people came out against the violent expansion of the Anglo-American polity and
political economy, a phenomenon already 300 years old but rarely opposed by workers or
artisans. At the same time, workers around the world also grappled with new forms of
empire, both informal and formal empire, and how to interpret it and accommodate or
oppose it.
5
Yet, in the next twenty years, many American labor leaders and workers
A George S. Boutwell, The Enslavement ofAmerican Labor (Boston, 1902), 4. Massachusetts
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would come to embrace U.S. military intervention in a world war which many argued
was a war for global power between competing European empires. 6 Why is this?
While a number of scholars have sought to explain this change in labor leaders'
positions on U.S. foreign policy between 1898 and 1917, they have not yet investigated
the attitudes and politics of the mass of American workers (within and outside organized
labor's ranks) on questions of foreign policy in this period. 7 Their opinions and activities
seem as important, if not more important, than those of labor leaders, and historians
should not simply infer that the statements of certain labor leaders reflected the views of
their rank-and-file union members or other workers. 8 If we accept that empires
historically have required active participation and support-or at least passive or active
consent-from not only elites and the middle-class but also a significant portion of the
workers and poor who directly or indirectly contributed their daily labors to imperial
conquest and commerce, then we need to explore the forces that may have influenced
American workers' relationship to the new American empire. Workers were not merely
"complicit" in empire; workers resisted, accommodated themselves or consented to, or
participated and actively supported the construction of the modern American empire.
Cultural historians of U.S. empire have recently tended to interpret labor leaders'
opposition to the war in Philippines as an expression of economic fear and racism. Labor
6 David Montgomery, "Workers' Movements in the U.S. Confront Imperialism: The Twentieth Century
Experience," Lecture, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts. November 4, 2006.
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leaders' attitudes, they contend, flowed from their hostility towards cheap lahor that
might take employment from native-born workers, depress wages and livings standards,
and from their belief that immigrant workers were unfit for citizenship in a self-
governing republic. 9 Undoubtedly, there is some merit to these conclusions, and certainly
evidence for these claims exists in the historical record of American trade union leaders'
discourse.
However, the sources of working-class opposition to the construction of the new
American empire was both at once far more complex and simple than those suggested by
cultural historians of U.S. empire. American working-class politics spanned a spectrum
of opinions shaped not only by race and republicanism but by gender, religion, and
ethnicity, furthermore, radical politics and political movements intersected with workers"
concerns about the transformations of American society in this period, and also affected
how they related to the nation and conceived of themselves as citizens. More simply,
American workers who had gained dignity, income and even protective legislation
through unions and labor politics wanted to preserve the precious gains that they made
from real and exaggerated or inflated threats.
In retrospect, the violent expansion of the United States into the Caribbean and
the Pacific Rim at the turn of the last century provoked attempts by a militant minority of
working-class organizers, agitators and intellectuals to build a movement against empire
within the labor and larger reform movements. Some individuals, including those like
George McNeill and middle-class reformers in the Anti-Imperialist League, hoped
to
appeal to American workers by addressing them as citizens of an endangered
republic.
By looking backward to the political ideals of the revolutionary generation,
such activists
" Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues, 73-88.
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contended that the new U.S. empire contradicted traditional republican values. 10 Others,
including Morrison Swift, also appealed to workers' republican political culture and
sense of Americanism, but infused the plastic discourses of American citizenship and
national identity with a new, forward-looking social politics based on human and
international solidarity.
These radicals suggested that American society and the economy had developed
structures which necessarily and inevitably forced military expansion to protect and
extend American commerce and investments abroad. Even though Swift and fellow
radicals were unable, much like the middle-class Anti-Imperialists, to build and sustain
an effective movement, Swift and other radicals proposed the only viable means to
halting the violent, overseas expansion of the United States' monopoly capitalist
economy and political economy. In making their proposals, these radicals appealed to
American workers as the only force capable of bringing an end to empire and creating
conditions for a new kind of citizenship in a post-imperial society.
THE PERILS OF SOCIALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
Like many future Progressives, Morrison Swift was disgusted by the corruption of
American politics, parties, and government. Swift joined many middle-class and
working-class radicals and socialists in believing that the Democratic Party presidential
candidacy of populist leader William Jennings Bryan in 1896 was imperfect, at best. Ever
the idealist, Swift was sickened by the spoils and self-interest rampant
in both the
Democratic and Republican machines. He sought a meaningful alternative.
10
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Swift at first seemed to support experiments in building exemplary Utopian
alternative communities as a strategy for reaching his new society. In September. 1896,
after Swift had worked briefly in a San Francisco rubber factory and made a short-lived
attempt to organize a "Society of American Socialists" in the Bay area, he was elected
national organizer for the Brotherhood of the Cooperative Commonwealth. Founded in
the fall of 1895 by an obscure Yankee socialist reformer, Norman Wallace Lermond, of
Thomaston, Maine, the Brotherhood hoped to educate Americans about socialism by
settling socialist enclaves in a western state and eventually taking control of its state
government, a necessary precursor, they believed, to building a nationwide fraternal
organization of cooperationists. Bryan's defeat in the 1896 election caused many dejected
socialists to enlist in the Brotherhood's cause. By June of 1897, blacklisted union
members seeking a livelihood had also joined, and the Brotherhood had expanded to 125
branches and contained 107 members willing to commit $45,000 to the construction of a
model colony in Washington state."
But Swift clearly became disenchanted with colonization schemes (in 1897
Eugene Debs succeeded him as national organizer for the BCC) and returned to political
action. An incisive critic, Swift now rejected Utopian socialist communities.
Colonizationists mistakenly assumed that "socialism in one colony" could successfully
compete with capitalist firms in a capitalist economy. He quickly learned that these
projects attracted individuals with plenty of ideals but little practical knowledge or
experience. Such endeavors seemed doomed to failure. Swift pleaded that model colonies
only weakened the reform movement by diverting socialists and radicals
from political
action. "Take them away, set them to splitting rails on the prairie and
building cabins in
11 Quint The Forging ofAmerican Socialism, 282-285.
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the air, and you have diverted them from the work they were doing of leavening the
American continent with social intelligence," he wrote after leaving the Brotherhood.
Swift accurately observed that colonies resulted only in "great smoke of advertisement
and preparation and little fire of achievement." 12 It was a form of retreat.
But Swift also refused to work within the longest-living socialist party in the
United States. As we noted in the last chapter, Swift, in the midst of the great depression
of 1893 and 1894, had collaborated with the Socialist Labor Party in Boston. At the time
the SLP had few members locally or nationally. Despite its support for his efforts to
organize the unemployed, the party's politics and internal practice quickly alienated Swift
from the party. He soon analyzed the reasons for the SLP's failure to gain support from
American workers and urged fellow socialists and radicals to stay away from SLP leaders
like Daniel DeLeon and their party.
13
Swift faulted the Socialist Labor Party primarily for failing to adapt to the
peculiarities of U.S. working-class political culture. The SLP's internationalist doctrine
erected a crude Marxist screen of cultural reductionism which blinded party members to
uniquely American conditions. Although Swift hardly considered himself a nationalist, he
believed that the SLP's largely German constituency had made it "foreign and exotic"
and isolated it from American workers. On the other hand, suggested Swift, Bellamyite
Nationalists had converted to socialism not just members of the middle class but also
many workers who considered themselves middle class. Although the Nationalists failed
by limiting themselves to education and abstaining from electoral
politics, the SLP had
12
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failed because it entered the political field without the support of the middle class or the
working class-the latter whom the SLP mistakenly approached as proletarians.
The SLP had imposed the class consciousness of European politics on American
soil. The American worker, explained Swift in the social biological discourse of his day,
"hasn't the groundwork for a healthy class consciousness of the European
breed. His consciousness is essentially a middle class consciousness, and when
you tell him to hate the middle class you tell him to hate himself. Possibly he
deserves to, but he isn't going to do it. The European peasant and workingman
has centuries of proletarianism in his blood. Put in a drop of class consciousness
and the whole liquid turns instantly black with it. But you can hypodermically
inject a stream of class consciousness from a class conscious hydrant into the
American workingman, and he throws it off serenely because his blood and
history are different from European workingman blood and history. This is true,
however bad his actual condition as a workingman may be."
Swift suggested that the vulgar Marxism of these "scientific socialists" had made them
"pathological"; their "metaphysical bosh" rendered them incapable of practical
participation in American politics. If ever successful, their bitter "class struggle" theories
would result only in bloodletting and tyranny reminiscent of the Jacobins. "Today in the
cauldron of the official socialist labor minds, it is the capitalists who are pulling the wires
and every move on the American checker-board is prompted by a mortal conspiracy
against their step-children, the working class. Such minds," Swift maintained, "are
capable of anything."
14
The only option left for Swift was to form his own political party. In January,
1897, not long after departing from the Brotherhood, Swift launched a monthly
publication, the Public Ownership Review, through which he hoped to organize a cross-
class socialist third party. Swift hoped that local "Public Ownership" clubs
would form
14
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the long-term educational base on which a party could eventually form, uniting
disaffected and reformist Democrats, Progressives, Populists, and socialists. Swift hoped
to avoid the SLP's alienating approach by building a movement and party that was
implicitly socialist but explicitly reformist, thereby respecting the United States'
indigenous political culture. Swift's five-point program called for "Public Ownership of
all Monopolies, including the Trusts and the Land," the popular initiative and
referendum, civil-service reforms, proportional representation and "the Imperative
Mandate," and immediate employment on public works for the jobless. Swift imagined
that he could avoid a self-interested party bureaucracy by refraining from elections until a
mass membership could be recruited. In Swift's original and unique party strategy, the
public ownership movement would coalesce into a structure only immediately before
elections; immediately afterward, the provisional party organization would dissolve and
return power to members in clubs at the base. 15
Swift's recrudescent middle-class sensibilities infused his calls for reform in the
journal, and clearly most Public Ownership party supporters were middle-class. But
Swift's publication and program clearly appealed to some workers, including laborers in
Oregon and Arkansas, trolley operators in New York City, and even one New Hampshire
factory worker afraid to distribute party literature for fear of being fired.
16
Nevertheless,
Swift was always more accomplished as an agitator and grassroots organizer, and while
his third party strategy seemed theoretically sound, the Public Ownership Party never
gained enough members or support to get off the ground. Swift's achievement with the
public ownership movement instead resided in his ability to propose a
forward-looking
15
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socialist politics that accepted "the Trusts" of modern monopoly capitalism. His
American form of socialism sought not a return to an imagined, nineteenth-century
republic of equality and simplicity, but instead adopted politics and the search for
political power as a way to capture concentrated capital and turn it to social ends.
AN EMPIRE FOR MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
Morrison Swift stood out among American socialists for accepting the ascendance
of modern monopoly capitalism as inevitable and even desirable, even while he
continued to invoke the precious traditions of American republicanism. Fully seventeen
years before Lenin wrote the famous pamphlet in which he suggested that imperialism
was both necessary and inevitable as the highest stage of capitalism-a stage in the
evolution of capitalism wrought by centralized, monopoly industrial and finance capital-
Swift suggested the same. Swift was hardly a theorist, and he certainly contributed little
to contemporary theories of empire, an enterprise most developed by British economist
J.A. Hobson in Imperialism (1902), a book which greatly influenced Lenin. But Swift
may have been the first socialist to propose what is widely regarded as a traditional
Marxist understanding of imperialism: an organic relationship between an advanced form
of capitalism (monopoly capitalism) and a political economy of expansion which
provided opportunities for the investment of surplus capital-a process that necessarily
• 1
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caused wars of colonization and occupation.
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Al the end of 1897, Swift believed that the American rcpublie was in an advanced
state of decline. An accomplished student of history and philosophy, Swift believed that
the ancient Roman republic had collapsed because it had conquered new territories that it
could not govern. But the problem facing the modern United States, Swift pointed out in
contrast to Rome, was not extensive but intensive. "Its extending territory is industrial
machinery," he wrote, "as difficult a thing to learn to govern as provinces." The greatest
challenge to industrial life was the recent monopolization of capital, land, and llnance-or,
as Swift was wont to write, "The Trusts." 19 Swift was convinced that the American
experiment and its citizenry needed to master industrial production and distribution.
A sort of syndicalist, Swift believed that capital would become so centralized that
it would eventually form a "Trust of Trusts," which, once subjected to popular political
rule, would become a "Universal Trust." Swift called that the horizontal integration of
giant capitalist corporations then raging across the nation a "higher organization of
business" that was "the necessary product of business evolution." The dissolution of the
trusts, a policy advocated by many liberal reformers, could only result in "industrial
retrogression." Yet, the private control of monopoly capitalist firms allowed capital to
subjugate and dominate "all branches of government" and reduced the population to a
monopoly (or "Trust") phase of capitalist development and wars of occupation and conquest as early as
1899. See Morrison I. Swift, Imperialism and Liberty (Los Angeles, 1899), 218: "Real military expansion
did not fairly set in till thirty years ago. There is a reason for its setting in then, a law of its
increase, and
certain assurance of continued increase according to that law. It began then with full vigor
because at that
period civilized nations became fully stocked with capital and the era of surplusage |sic| opened.
Investments ceased to pay as before, since there was much more capital accumulated to invest than
profitable places for investment. This was an epoch and turning point in the economic
history ol the world
Three movements of paramount meaning arose through this industrial event: (1) A
desire for stable
forms of investment, (2) The impulse for new markets by appropriation or conquest, (3)
I he tendency to
develop armed force for the protection of monopolized capital. All of these
processes are organic elements
of the grand transformation which the surplus of saved capital is causing.
They combine to show that
military armaments will continue to expand according to a definite law,
because they combine lo enforce
that increase."
19
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state of "servility." Like many traditional Marxists, Swift decried private control of the
means of production even while he welcomed the evolution of capitalism as a necessary
stage in social development that had to precede public ownership and government
administration of the national economy.
Like many Marxists and socialists, Swift also subscribed to a labor theory of
value and an economic crisis theory of under-consumption. Whereas many capitalists
emphasized that industrial over-production had precipitated the recent depression and
required new markets abroad, Swift suggested that domestic wages were too low to
sustain consumption. Monopoly capitalism had formed two social classes, first, the
capitalists and investors, professionals and middle-class retailers, and second, farmers
and "mechanics and other laborers" who engaged in "the real production of wealth or
tend to the moral or intellectual advancement of the race." Swift argued that elites who
believed in an over-production theory of crisis failed to recognize that depressions and
recessions were not attributable to the fact that "every worker has all he needs, but to the
fact that his wages are insufficient to buy back what he produced." Only the "public
ownership of all the means and sources of wealth and culture," suggested Swift, could
prevent economic crisis and restore a balance between labor, wealth, and consumption.
Swift urged his readers to fight for municipal and state control of industries in
order to prove the possibility of government ownership and administration of the
economy. In the pages of the Public Ownership Review, he maintained a kind of running
tally of municipal or state takeovers of industries in the United States
and Europe to
prove the efficacy of his program and inspire supporters. He disdained
as diversionary
21
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not only the dogmatism of the Socialist Labor Party, but populists who continued to
advocate for monetary policies like the free coinage of silver, and single-taxers after
Henry George, all of whom ignored the central question of centralized production and
distribution. He also had little sympathy for the voluntarism of AFL trade unions. In early
1898, Swift noticed that AFL Vice-President P.J. McGuire had endorsed working-class
political action, even though McGuire warned it would invite reactionary repression from
the nation's rulers. Swift scoffed at McGuire and the tepid conservatism of the AFL.
"Never in all its history has it made one intelligent political attempt," Swift barked. By
not supporting third-parties, Swift complained, working-class voters reinforced the anti-
labor forces in the Democratic and Republican parties; working-class participation in
elections would bear fruit only when an alternative party had gained workers' support
22
and entered the political field.
Despite his tireless advocacy on behalf of the nascent "Public Ownership Party"
(which organized clubs only in California and a handful of other states). Swift began to
turn his attention to a different concern. Beginning in January, 1898, Swift invoked
traditional republican fears of standing armies to marshal opposition to an imminent U.S.
war with Spain. Swift warned his readership that the imminent annexation of Hawaii and
Cuba indicated that the army and navy were uniting with capital in order to protect "the
universal monopoly that is near." Swift worried that American territorial expansion
overseas would form the pretense for a "despotism" which, fearing popular agitation,
would require a large standing army that elites would use to organize "violence on a
large
scale to hold the people in awe and silence." Swift eagerly desired
freedom for the
Cubans, and believed that Cuban independence would greatly benefit the
world. "Spain
22
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adds to modern capitalist tyranny the worst elements of feudal tyranny," Swift argued;
Spain's imminent loss of its colonies could only weaken a military which allowed
Spanish rulers to oppress their own population. However, Swift also warned pro-
independence Cubans to beware of indigenous and American elites who would seek to
monopolize Cuban wealth after winning the war. The oppressions and miseries imposed
on citizens and workers by monopoly capitalism tended to render national self-
determination meaningless. "The original question of national freedom and supremacy is
now complicated with the question of the supremacy of capital, which forms an upper
layer running through all nations," Swift contended."
But Swift warned that overseas military intervention would also cost Americans
dearly. Mobilization would certainly improve the economy in the short-term, but the
maintenance of a permanent military after the war would burden taxpayers with
enormous expense. Even though the size of the continental mainland would probably
cause this standing army to remain mostly in North America, Swift suggested, it would
be increasingly used to suppress the labor and unemployed movements. It would
empower a "vulgar element" of militarists jealous of the armed might of European
nation-states, and would cause them "to go everywhere interfering." Perhaps looking
askance at the veterans of the Civil War whom he had encountered, war would cause "a
certain senility" in the average veteran, who would be "always afterward dwelling on the
marvelous things he has done," having endured "so much excitement that he is. to use the
phrase, a back number." Even worse, foreign war would divert reformers and radicals
23
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from the paramount social question facing the domestic United States and the world. 24
Future events certainly justified a great deal of Swift's apprehension. Swift should have
been more concerned with himself than other reformers, for in the next lour years he
abandoned his struggle to form a third party and instead thrust himself into fevered
agitation against a new American empire.
EMPIRE AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS AND
CULTURE
Between 1898 and 1902, Morrison Swift adopted a principled, indigenous and
forward-looking critique of the new U.S. empire and its expansionist, militarist political
economy. While the largely middle-class members of the New England and national
Anti-Imperialist League looked to a simple and allegedly non-expansionist republican
past in order to critique America's domination of Cuba and its military occupation of the
Philippines, Swift and other working-class agitators and organizers denounced the
McKinley administration for its violent extension of monopoly capitalism and its
insatiable hunger for markets and resources. These anti-empire radicals suggested that
U.S. empire could only be defeated if the workers joined the middle class and organized
to abolish the private economic imperatives behind expansion by reordering America's
political economy.
Nonetheless, Swift developed his own indigenous, Yankee discourse of
Americanism against empire. While he joined the middle-class anti-imperialists in
invoking the republican political traditions of American and English history, he also
spurned the liberalism and paternalism of the respectable anti-imperialists
by developing
24 Swift Public Ownership Review, January, 1898; Swift, Public Ownership
Review, April-May 1898.
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both an anti-capitalist and an anti-racist internationalism. Swift incessantly resorted to
American and European cultural constructions which, according to recent cultural
historians of empire, tainted even the Anti-Imperialist movement. But Swift appropriated
the flexible discourses of race, particularly Anglo-Saxonism, religion, republicanism, and
culture in order to express his antipathy to racism, cultural colonialism, and America's
political, social and economic domination of others that characterized the new U.S.
empire.
It also suggests that culture, ideology and discourse are best analyzed by
historians in relationship to politics. Through a history that includes politics, historians
may best discern human motivation and intent by attempting to weigh the variable
meanings and intentions of discourse, expression and language against human activity.
As Eric Foner has carefully written about the recent scholarship on "whiteness,"
discourses and ideologies which are concerned with culture are inherently ambivalent and
plastic. Culturalist concepts such as the racial category of "whiteness," Foner reminds us,
"are never the only characteristic that shapes individual identity. As a category of
analysis, whiteness runs the risk of homogenizing a vast population that differs within
itself in terms of class, religion, gender, politics, and in many other way . . .The
historian's task is to examine the specific historical circumstances under which one or
another element of identity comes to the fore as a motivation for political and social
»25
action.
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Swift was hardly alone in the earliest stages of this working-class movement
against empire. Even though many workers and members of the middle class in 1898
hastened to support William McKinley and the Congress in retaliating for the explosion
of the Maine, not all supported the initial foray against the Spanish to the south. Three
years earlier, AFL President Samuel Gompers, himself an English immigrant, had
denounced U.S. saber-rattling at Great Britain regarding its dispute over the boundary
between Venezuala and British Guiana. "Labor is never for war," Gompers suggested:
It is always for peace. It is on the side of liberty, justice and humanity.
These three are always for peace . . . Who would be compelled to bear the burden
of war? The working people. They would pay the taxes, and their blood would
flow like water. The interests of the working people of England and the United
States are common. They are fighting the same enemy. They are battling to
emancipate themselves from conditions common to both countries. The working
people know no country. They are citizens of the world, and their religion is do
what is right, what is just, what is grand and glorious and valorous and chivalrous.
The battle for the cause of labor, from times of remotest antiquity, has been for
peace and good-will among men. 26
In 1895, however, Cuban insurgents led by Jose Marti mounted one final armed
rebellion against Spanish rule. Trade unionists across the United States, in both the
Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, hailed the Cuban independence
movement and pressured the administration and Congress to recognize the Cubans as
belligerents. At its 1897 convention, the AFL passed a resolution condemning imminent
U.S. annexation of Hawaii, largely because the Senate refused to repeal Hawaii's
contract
labor laws (Congress had made contract labor illegal in the continental United States
in
1885). In a highly contentious debate, a majority of delegates, supported by
Gompers,
26 Quoted in Philip Foner, U.S. Labor Movement and Latin America: A History of
Workers ' Response to
Intervention, Volume I, 1846-1 919 (South Hadley, 1988), 13.
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reaffirmed their sympathy with the Cubans, but shouted down "jingoists" on the
convention floor who hoped to endorse an invasion.
The destruction of the Maine in Havana harbor on February 15. 1898, clearly
caused many workers to initially rally behind U.S. military intervention in the Spanish-
Cuban conflict. The Hearst press and other newspapers popular among working-class
readers probably played no small part. But a few working-class leaders still suspicious of
elite motives strained to maintain worker and union opposition to intervention. In April,
the International Association of Machinists' journal expressed sympathy for the loss of
life in the Maine disaster, but also pointed to a daily thcarnival of carnage" within
American industry. In a widely circulated document titled "A peace Appeal to Labor,"
Bolton Hall, treasurer of the American Longshoreman's Union, pointed to the war's
dampening effect on reform. "A war will put all social improvements among us back ten
years/' warned Hall. "If there is a war, you will furnish the corpses and the taxes, and
others will get the glory. Speculators will make money out of it-that is, out of you. Men
will get high prices for inferior supplies, leaky boats, for shoddy clothes and pasteboard
shoes, and you will have to pay the bill, and the only satisfaction you will get is the
privilege of hating your Spanish fellow-workmen, who are really your brothers and who
have had as little to do with the wrongs of Cuba as you have."
And yet, after April 25, when war was finally declared by President McKinley
with the support of a majority of the Congress, many workers wholeheartedly supported
the war effort. Joseph R. Buchanan, a longtime labor organizer for the AFL and anarchist,
correctly noted that many American workers accepted traditional republican principles
of
self-rule that easily translated into an anti-colonial sentiment against
Spanish tyranny in
:7 Quoted in Foner, U.S. Labor Movement and Latin America, 17-19
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Cuba. Furthermore, the Teller amendment to the Congressional endorsement of the war
promised the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the island upon the war's conclusion. In this
political environment, Gompers and the leaders of several previously anti-war unions like
the Sailor's Union and Railroad Brotherhoods rushed to secure political protection
against employers and government by declaring their loyalty to the war etfort. But in
July, with the annexation of Hawaii, union newspapers again signaled that organized
labor had great trepidation regarding overseas U.S. expansion. As the U.S. occupation of
the Philippines transformed into a counter-insurgency in late 1898 and 1899. working-
class opposition to American empire temporarily increased. 28 The fervor over Cuba
having subsided, Gompers returned to his anti-imperialist statements and in November,
1898, he joined the Anti-Imperialist League as one of its vice-presidents. The AFL
annual convention in December, 1898 won the support of many trade unionists when it
endorsed a statement calling upon "workingmen to awake to a full realization of the
dangers that confront them, and call upon their representatives with no uncertain voice to
save them from the dangers ... of imperialism."
29
But, as other scholars have pointed
out, official opposition to U.S. occupation of the Philippines within the labor movement
decreased as it became clear that the Congress would continue to protect the continental
United States from the threat of cheap Filipino immigrant labor and imports from Asia.
30
For their part, the majority of American socialists, including the SLP and the
Social Democracy of America, consistently opposed the war and simply denounced it as
a war by, for and of individual capitalists. But Swift stood out among socialists and other
28
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29
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opponents of the new U.S. empire for his analysis of empire and his attempts to reach
workers by developing an oppositional discourse in an American idiom, in his anti-
racism, and in his zealous defense of Filipino's right to violently resist American designs
on their land and sovereignty. Indeed, the import of Swift's writings and activity has been
almost entirely neglected, if not distorted, by most historians of this period. Swift's
extensive political journalism and poetry also suggests that the discourses of
Americanism, Anglo-Saxonism and republicanism were not entirely the province of those
in favor of building a new empire, nor did they necessarily connote cultural approval for
imperial conquest.
Swift differed from middle- and working-class anti-imperialists in his economic
analysis of empire. Swift certainly shared their belief that individual capitalists benefited
from U.S. dominance of markets and resources in Latin America and Asia, and had used
their political influence to promote imperial policies and wars of conquest. Yet, Swift
also believed that empire was the natural and necessary result of monopoly capitalism, a
stage of capitalism which produced immense surplus profits, a desire for secure
investment for this surplus capital, and eventually a standing army to protect monopoly
profits, trade, and overseas investments, and monopoly capitalists from social unrest at
home. "All of these processes are organic elements of the grand transformation which the
surplus of saved capital is causing," he noted. If the war had not occurred, Swift
maintained, "something similar to serve the guiding tendency would have happened.
Industrial monopoly is total and universal, and must be protected; its protection calls for
armies, and that is national militarism. Industrialism militarizes in order to terrorize."
1
Swift, Imperialism and Liberty, 187, 218-219.
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Like the members of the Anti-Imperialist League, Swift also lamented the soeial
and economie eosls that empire posed on the metropolitan citizenry. Even his old
adversary Edward Atkinson shared these sentiments. 32 In 1903, Atkinson, a thrifty
Yankee who loved numbers, estimated that the war with Spain sinee 1898 had cost
Americans more than $900 million. Atkinson suggested that the war in the Philippines
had also brought comparatively little commercial profit given promises of improved
commerce; up to June 30, 1902, noted Atkinson, "we had been paying for five years on
dollar and five cents (41.05) per head of our population to secure an export which had
amounted to six and one-half (6V4) cents per head, on which there might have been a
profit to some one at the rate of one cent per head of the whole population.' Swift
concurred that the war drained public coffers which might otherwise be dedicated to
public uses, but he also believed it would be highly profitable to manufacturers who
secured markets and investors in government bonds.
34 More important to Swift than per
capita expense, however, was the cost of empire to American ideals and American
values; that loss deeply troubled him.
Whether or not he sincerely believed it or used it as rhetoric for his political
purposes, Swift soaked his screeds in effusive celebrations of republicanism and
Americanism, infusing his sometimes tortured prose with fiery denunciations of empire
for its violations of sacred Anglo-American political traditions. At times, he merely
seemed to echo the backward-looking lamentations of the Anti-Imperialist League. This
12
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former student of Herbert Baxter Adams clearly believed that the English republican
traditions of virtue, self-government and limited representative democracy instilled by the
experience of the Civil War and the Commonwealth represented social and political
progress. But American nationhood and the principle of self-determination signaled a
departure from English and European societies, in that Americans hoped to escape the
feudal legacies of rule by monarchs, aristocrats and armies. But Swift knew that the
American republic had only recently evolved from a monarchical English political
system and empire, and he sensed in the era of monopoly capitalism a kind of industrial
feudalism that formed a continuity with the residue of tyranny constantly lurking in the
English origins of American political culture.
Furthermore, he understood that republican freedoms and virtue required a rough
equality in the distribution of wealth. Plentiful land had allowed the American republic to
flourish, but by the 1890s these lands had been exhausted or monopolized. Swift
lamented the loss of the frontier even while he acknowledged that the rapacious primitive
accumulation of westward expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth century had
provided great abundance but exacted enormous costs to Americans' virtue. "0
Americans, you have sad, hard lessons to learn," wrote Swift in the summer of 1898.
"You have thought that you could reap all the blessings of virtue without being virtuous,
that you could gather all the richness of a new continent and a new world without paying
35
for it in character. You will have to pay."
Now expansion overseas, and especially the need for an army to occupy the
Philippines after the Cuban "expedition," empowered an interventionist and self-
interested standing army and threatened what remained of American
virtue. Swift
35
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displayed an ecumenical knowledge of republican theorists, including Machiavelli, who
had warned republican citizens in his Discourses on Books of Livy to avoid military
adventurism. Congress, now controlled by capital, would inevitably defer to the needs of
monopolists, and short of socialism, the only immediate remedy to this situation for Swift
lay in placing grave decisions about war within the purview of the citizenry, through
popular referendums or by requiring mass conscription of men from all classes.
Otherwise overseas adventures would fatally corrupt America's admittedly imperfect but
potentially democratic political institutions. "imperialism cancels the Constitution and
takes the life of popular government," declared Swift. 36
And yet, even though Swift condemned British imperialism in South Africa.
India, and elsewhere, and sought to link McKinley's empire-building policies with the
already mature empire established by Great Britain, he also consistently praised the
libertarian and republican traditions of what he often called "the Anglo-Saxon race." As
one scholar has noted, the term "race" in this period was "highly unstable" and could
imply any number of social differences based on "biological, historical, political,
37
psychological, physiological, linguistic, or some combination" of these categories.
Swift certainly used, and quite probably accepted, social biological concepts popularized
in a period when Darwin's ideas of human evolution had been appropriated by social
biologists eager to construct and reify cultural differences as racially distinct.
But the multiple discourses of race, it must be admitted, were not always
ployed in order to endorse the imposition of imperial power on other cultures. Swift,em
36
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for one, utilized the multivalent language of race and social biology by deploying it to
strike against the new American empire. The political traditions Swift and so many others
of his day associated with different "races" really served as an identification of historical
continuities and discontinuities in different political cultures within and between various
cultures and societies, and Swift in effect turned the discourses of empire against empire
itself.
Swift sincerely asserted that McKinley and other promoters of the new American
empire had departed from the finest traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race. President
McKinley and his administration, and his supporters in the Congress and business circles,
Swift felt, had betrayed the political principles not only of America but centuries of
political development in England. By imposing imperialism on "liberty-loving"
Americans, Swift declared, McKinley had practiced a "breed" of "statesmanship of the
most consummate and royal brand, and we humbly remark that it is not democratic and
not Anglo-Saxon."
38
Their corruption of ancient Anglo-Saxon political traditions and
protections against the abuse of state power had introduced a virulent authoritarianism
and tyranny into the American body politic:
"America then, the pure and beloved, the unsullied divine child of
Destiny, is at death's door with vile diseases, caught by the poor child when it
was going about nights seeing the world as fag of its envied instructors, the
European Powers. It has drunk of the exudations of British scrofula, and who can
live after that? In this place it caught the Dreyfus chancre, in that noisome alley
the English Boer complaint, in a third the Russian tubercle of autocracy.
The
lovely offspring of liberty and manly revolution is ulcered from head to foot, and
each ulcer is one of those mean malignant ones taken where honor and
purity
would not have been. Will America survive this? There seems to be just
one
hope-that the excess of foulness of the eating sores may arouse a reaction."
38
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Although Swift used "fag" here to describe America as a drudge or servile
inferior to the mature Europeans, he clearly implied that American imperialism
represented a kind of prostitution that had infected American political culture with the
ailments of European militarism and authoritarianism.
He reserved special ire for the instruction of the British in preparing Americans to
sully themselves with empire. Swift noted that in an 1899 address to San Francisco
merchants Lord Charles Beresford, an admiral in the British Navy, praised America's
entry into the race for empire and the recently announced "Open Door" policy in China.
But, when prompted, Beresford cheerfully denied having any Saxon blood; Beresford
traced his lineage to William the Conqueror. Sarcasm dripped from Swift's poison pen as
he invoked the long-standing thesis of radical Anglo-American republicans who argued
that the "Norman Yoke" had rudely ripped the ancient English from a state of nature.
40
"Every true American ought to revere Beresford after that," he wrote. "He is a
lord, and he came over with William, the pious William who stripped their lands from the
liberty-seeking Saxons, destroyed their free institutions, and retarded the growth of
popular freedom and upright human independence in England for centuries, infusing a
foul strain of domineering robber poison which still runs in the Anglo-Saxon vein and
prevents the realization of justice, the evolution of character, and the consummation of
democracy."
41
Clearly, Swift keenly felt the painful contradictions of Anglo-American
39
Ibid., 466.
40
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1966),
41
Swift, Imperialism and Liberty, 80-86.
99
political culture. His often utterly unpalatable poetry illustrated the commonalities and
continuities he detected between English and American political institutions, culture and
history that both inspired and repelled him:
"But if you would have union of the Anglo-Saxon race,
If you would wipe dishonor from the Anglo-Saxon face,
Abhor the king and wealthy man, and sweep them from the fold
Restore the common people to the sceptre and the gold."42
Swift was not alone in questioning the positive relationships between racial and ethnic
identity that Roosevelt and other imperialists had tried to tie to U.S. expansion. Although
many immigrant workers certainly welcomed the war in Cuba as an opportunity to prove
loyalty to their new nation and their manliness, not all, including certain radical Irish
nationalists in Boston, consistently supported U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and the
Pacific.
43
Swift also invoked the masculine discourse of empire and the "strenuous life" that
Teddy Roosevelt had so successfully cultivated and popularized.
44
Swift undoubtedly
feared that the experience of imperialism might degenerate the morals of male American
soldiers.
45
But Swift used it in his agitation against empire by associating it with a
supposedly masculine desire for political freedom, political rights, and resistance to
tyranny. I le asked American men to resist emasculation by turning away from empire
to
42 Morrison I. Swift, from "Anglo-Saxon Union," in Advent ofEmpire (Los
Angeles, 1900), 3 I
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socialism. Americans, Swift declared, are "manly," and intervened in world affairs only
"to help and civilize the world without militarism and murder, and tyranny made legal by
our fiat, and industrial pillage."46 President McKinley, who had capitulated to monopoly
capital and its representatives in Congress, Swift alleged, had submitted to those who
desired war in order to consolidate his political support for the upcoming presidential
race. "He did not want to make enemies in his party for fear of losing a second
presidential term," Swift charged, "so he truckled and gave up his manhood and became a
traitor to his trust."
47
Swift appealed to the republicanism of the American citizen-soldiers of the
revolutionary generation in order to inspire political resistance to empire, summoning
"the men of Bunker Hill" to "rise from the earth for whose liberty you bled, to rebuke this
blasphemy and restore your weakened descendants to manhood."
48 By contrast, and again
turning to the powerful metaphor of sexual enslavement, professional soldiers in a
standing army could only ever be "an anachronism in civilization, the male prostitute,
being among men what the abandoned woman is among her sex."
49 A standing army ol
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49 Swift Imperialism and Liberty, 208. Hoganson, Fightingfor American Manhood, cites this passage
in
Imperialism and Liberty and implies that Swift here expressed a fear that professional soldiering
would
lead to homosexuality. It is far more likely that Swift (as Hoganson cautiously
concedes in her own words)
was implying that "'soldiering was an immoral profession"-especially in an
army for empire.
Hoganson also contends (189) that Swift worried that the U.S. military presence
in Asia would
lead to racial mixing, and she associates him with the likes of anti-imperialist
and racist Senator James F.
Pettigrew Hoganson quotes only part of the passage (1 have underlined
the text quoted and included by
Hoganson) in Swift's Imperialism and Liberty and does not provide its context,
misinterpreting Swift s
typical sarcastic style. Those familiar with Swift's poorly executed
style will quickly discern that he
intended to expose and condemn atrocities in the Philippines while mocking
American racists fears of
"miscegenation " Swift titled the passage on U.S. soldiers'
behavior in the Philippines, Rapers Also and
began by quoting verbatim from reports sent from the Philippines
to Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn
that Swift had found reprinted in the San Francisco Call,
October 13, 1899:
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professional soldiers could only ever lead to "a life of strenuous idleness on the part of
the soldiering half of mankind and of strenuous toil of the other half to support them."50
Furthermore, and unlike many supporters of the Anti-Imperialist League who
partially based their dislike for empire on their fear of assimilating "races" unable to
govern themselves, Swift spurned the racialist and paternalist arguments for American
empire as a beneficent exercise in uplifting peoples of allegedly inferior cultures." In the
first article in the Public Ownership Review in which he declared his opposition to the
Cuban war, Swift pointed to the reconstructed South and the West as examples of the
horrible "blessings" of a capital-fueled white paternalism, in which southern Blacks faced
"denials of the ballot" and "ballot-box massacres" and Native Americans had suffered
• • • 52
"robbery and progressive extermination." "
Swift countered the enlightened imperialists by placing freedom and self-
determination at the very center of his definition of civilization and its blessings. Those
subjected to empire. Swift objected, lacked "independent development, self-development,
the power of standing alone and going forward without leading or being led. Order,
"'An American chaplain in Malabon, whose name I withhold, told me thai in his lust parish work
he had been told by the natives of Malabon that their wives and daughters had been raped by our soldiers,
lie could authenticate only live cases. The papers of that dale (September 15) say thai two men in Manila
have been condemned to death for maltreating native women. I saw again and again the brothels of
Manila
crowded to the doors by our soldiers, and the saloons also. All these things may be unavoidable at times.
'-
Bencticent assimilation war-times, that is. And this the form assimilation will take. The wives and
dMm. hiers of the Filipino 'niters' will be assimilated by the males of the higher race, as the wives and
daughters of the colored race were bv the planters during slavery . It will be in brothels and
elsewhere, and
this mixing of the blood will he called civilization . Every brothel should contain an
American clergyman,
paid by the government, to pray over the ceremony and thank God lor human progress
" Sw.lt, Imperialism
and Liberty, 475, 479-480.
50
Swift, Imperialism and Liberty, 205.
S|
For a recent definition ofthe paternalism characteristic of
American empire al the turn ol the last century,
see Renda, Taking Haiti, 15.
52
Swilt, Imperialism and Liberty, 1-3.
102
justice, and humanity are developed in chattel slaves, but they lack a prime requisite of
civilization, without which civilization is not. They are not free." 53 Claims by
policymakers and elites for a progressive nature of American empire would always be
secondary and subject to empire's original commercial purposes. "The law of
imperialistic colonizing is this," noted Swift. "No outlay shall be made for 'civilizing'
purposes which does not promise to return, sooner or later, the usual rate of returns on
invested capital. The corollary of this law is that civilization is not an end in itself but a
means to an end-a means for increasing and firmly establishing commerce. This simple
principle is the key to the entire mighty network of imperialist dogmas concerning duty,
religion, humanity, unselfishness and civilization."54 American military intervention and
occupation could never benefit nor improve either Americans or their colonial subjects.
Most importantly, Swift differed from the Anti-Imperialists in his increasingly
militant international solidarity with the Filipino resistance. As early as January, 1899,
Swift had started to express his opposition in a Los Angeles lecture series.'" Only a few
years later, Swift not only called for American withdrawal from the Philippines; he
endorsed insurgent attacks on American soldiers. "I declare that the Tagals are the real
American army today," opined Swift rather provocatively. "We ought to furnish them
comfort and succor" for upholding American principles in their own country.
36
Swift
passionately denounced the "millionaire savages" who sought to subdue "our superb
53
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Filipino saviors
. . .
Fight on, brave Tagals, never cease your guerrilla war
. . . Keep heart
and fight on, hand to hand with the people[,] your brothers here, to destroy the common
foe of humanity."57
Such solidarity was far too radical for the Anti-Imperialist League, especially
once that organization had retreated after Gamiliel Bradford's endorsement in August,
1899, of a "peace conference" and "moral alliance with the Filipinos.'08 In fact, the AIL
quickly distanced itself from Swift once he formed a "Filipino Liberation Society" in Los
Angeles and forwarded copies of a pro-independence petition to the Philippines, a copy
of which landed in the hands of Brigadier General Joe Wheeler, a former Confederate
commander. 59 Such internationalism seemed to win Swift more critics than converts.
Yet, Swift also went beyond liberal sympathy with the plight of the beleaguered
American volunteer soldier. The Massachusetts Reform Club had held some of the first
hearings on the poor medical treatment, sanitation, and deficient supplies and food
received by Americans in the Cuban and Philippine excursions. Swift shared these
sympathies, and often reprinted letters from soldiers and family members who now felt
betrayed by a military poorly prepared for rapid deployment and long-term occupation
overseas. But Swift also risked charges of treason by urging soldiers to resist the war in
any way possible. "Refuse to enlist, refuse to fight," called Swift:
57
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You who are in the Philippines, demand immediate passage home. You
who have not yet gone, refuse to go. There is a law high above the word of an
officer, the law of duty, the law of country. Your officers are commanding you to
destroy your country: will you obey them?
. . . You swore allegiance to your
nation, not a popinjay president ... Be men and bravely think. An American
soldier owes allegiance to his conscience and reason first, last and forever."60
Real traitors, Swift suggested, were not soldiers who resisted a war for commerce but
those like President McKinley who had traduced the sacred principles of his own nation.
Like manufacturers who, in the recent depression, refused to find employment for the
jobless and had lost their rights to property, elected officials like McKinley and their
government could no longer command obedience. In fact, it was the duty of every citizen
to disobey. "Whoever yields to the president now comforts and promotes a traitor to his
country, and connives at treason, subversion, and revolution," Swift trumpeted in
defiance. "He makes himself an accomplice of villains to destroy the institutions of
liberty."
61
While difficult to measure how any American soldiers might have responded
to such an appeal for resistance, certainly a few Irish volunteers displayed disgust with
suppressing a national rebellion and publicly stated their opposition. Re-enlistment rates,
furthermore, rapidly declined to a mere seven percent as the insurgency continued.
62
In the end, Swift seemed unable to rally many to his radical stance against the
new American empire. He incessantly appealed to workers as the only domestic social
force capable of dissolving an empire constructed for monopoly capitalism. His
poem, "A
Workingman's Opportunity," called on American workers to organize themselves
to act
against empire:
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"He can throw down the buttressed robber clan
That has assailed the righteous Philippines,
Crush under that rapacious type of man
On which the coward president falsely leans.
United Labor rushing to the van
Can save itself and this vile nation cleanse."63
But his effusive prose and poetry often betrayed a wrenching despair regarding
workers' apparent acquiescence, a pessimism about the future so severe that at times it
bordered on misanthropy. 64 Swift's appeals to working-class "Anglo-Saxon" manhood
undoubtedly would have only ever appealed to the thin stratum of American workers
around 1900 who were white, Protestant and class conscious. Certainly, Swift's incipient
anti-Semitism must have offended even left-leaning Jewish workers. 65 His choppy and
awkward prose, in books he almost always self-published, must have even further limited
his readership.
But the real fault behind the failure of disparate Americans to create a mass
movement against empire at the turn of the last century resides not with minor figures
like Swift but in the inability of organized labor, radical and socialists, and liberal
reformers and disaffected Democrats and Republicans to reconcile considerable
socioeconomic, cultural and political differences in order to rally a broad base of popular
opposition.
66 As for Gompers and organized labor, his fraternal union with fellow Anti-
Imperialist League vice-president and donor Andrew Carnegie only prefigured a further
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shift away from his earlier soeialist politics.67 But two months into the U.S. counter-
insurgency in the Philippines, Gompers addressed a Boston audience assembled at an
AIL meeting in Fremont Temple in terms that Swift probably would have applauded: "I
look forward to the time when the workers will settle this question [of how to abolish
war| by the dock laborers refusing to handle materials that are to be used to destroy their
fellow men, and the seamen of the world. . .while willing to risk their lives in conducting
the commerce of nations, refusing to strike down their fellow men, even though they may
be employed by a foreign power."
Certainly, the New England Anti-Imperialist League recruited only a few
working-class leaders to help them organize in the Boston area, George L. McNeill and
Henry Lloyd among them.69 Indeed, even labor leaders were split on the question of the
new empire. Although the venerable McNeill denounced the coup in Panama that
President Roosevelt had provoked to open the gates for the Panama Canal, Gompers
endorsed Roosevelt's policy at the AFL annual convention that met in Boston that year.
70
But it seems unlikely that an organization like the New Hngland Anti-Imperialist League,
led largely by aged and wealthy Mugwumps, would ever have been able to reach beyond
the labor officialdom to include the mass of rank-and-file union members.
Morrison Swift went beyond the guarded and inconsistent criticisms of labor
officials like Gompers and instead offered a radical critique of American
empire. He
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articulated an indigenous discourse of resistance to U.S. economic, cultural and social
domination overseas, and amidst a disjointed movement dominated by trade union
leaders and middle-class anti-imperialists, Swift seemed alone in comprehending the
enormity of the shift in American political culture, and in suggesting the only viable
resolution to the violence, terror and misery that empire inflicted on peoples abroad. At
home, many Americans of all classes continued to believe that they were still citizens in a
New World republic. But Swift understood that elites, and the workers and reformers
who participated in their policies, had already started to become subjects within a
political and social project of an entirely different order.
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CHAPTER 5
EPILOGUE: MORRISON SWIFT, AMERICAN WORKERS,
AND AMERICAN EMPIRE
Empire as a way of life is predicated upon having more than one needs
After a decade of organizing the unemployed and agitating against empire. Swift
had certainly developed his abilities as an orator, agitator, and radical journalist. But his
attempts at organizing a radical third party suited to America's particular political culture
had failed, and his militant defense of Filipino independence had gained him more
infamy than followers. As the American counter-insurgency in the Philippines receded in
the public imagination, the appeals of the relatively respectable Anti-Imperialist League
and Swift's screeds against empire certainly seemed to lose urgency, and their paeans to
an aging republic began to seem less poignant and increasingly anachronistic. Swift's
calls for American workers to honor the radical egalitarian and anti-authoritarian values
of "Anglo-Saxon" republicanism certainly seemed to hold less appeal for a rapidly
changing American working class, in which fewer and fewer workers, many of them
immigrants not of northwestern European origins, had been exposed to republican
political ideology. By World War I, however, most American workers had been exposed
to a Progressive politics that utilized the antagonisms between a
virtuous and
undifferentiated "people" and a selfish private "interest" contained within
republican
1
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ideology, but gave it a middle-class accent that abhorred both corruption and class
conflict.
Perhaps more importantly, radical political positions within the labor movement
against domestic militarism and American military interventionism abroad seemed to find
less sympathy amongst indigenous trade unionists who had once been concerned about
the decline of the venerable republic. Immigrants from European empire-states like
Russia or aspiring empire-states like Germany, on the other hand, seemed to be far more
conscious about the alleged benefits and considerable costs of empire. But they tended to
be socialists and anarchists, not radical republicans. Ideologically, Swift seemed to stand
outside of the new and largely immigrant currents in American radicalism. Me instead
continued to identify with the libertarian and communalist strains of Yankee culture.
Swift also persisted in agitating for a new America by organizing workers to
claim the social rights which Swift believed to be inherent in American citizenship. After
leaving southern California, Swift lived for a time in Philadelphia, and is alleged by one
historian to have been arrested while helping coal miners organize a strike in Hazleton,
Pennsylvania. Swift also may have been arrested in the summer of 1906 when he pasted
an "Arraignment of American Wealth Kings" on the doors to John D. Rockefeller's New
York home. 3 In 1907, Swift finally returned to Boston, where he agitated among striking
2
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Teamsters and began to serve as chief lecturer and director of the city's Humanist Forum,
posts he held until 1914.
4
But Swift also returned to a position of leadership amongst
Boston's poor and unemployed, commanding demonstrations of the unemployed
whenever economic recessions or depressions threw thousands of Boston's working class
out of work.
On January 8, 1908, Swift once more assembled several hundred unemployed
men on the Commons. The crowd endorsed a petition to Boston's mayor, the governor,
and the state legislature which reiterated demands for public works jobs and state farms
that Swift issued in previous crises. But the petition also contained more advanced
proposals including a statewide minimum wage, reduction in rents by 25 percent, and
unemployment pensions, a social "right" which implied "no element of charity." The
assembled marched to City Hall and presented the petition to Mayor George Hibbard.
One week later, after adding to the petition a demand for an agency to prevent suicides of
the unemployed (Swift often reprinted verbatim in his tracts various newspaper reports of
suicides by despondent unemployed workers), Swift led 200 men in delivering the
petition to Massachusetts Governor Curtis Guild, Jr. Swift and his followers received
little sympathy from any public official. Both the mayor and the governor replied to the
protests by insisting that private charity was sufficient and that Swift was "ignorant" ol
economic conditions in the state.
home... impoverished families, depraved their standard of life, filched their food, starved
their children of
wealth, joy, intelligence...."
i
Swift ever a proud American individualist and socialist idealist, also expressed his
values through
the first person- "I as one citizen repudiate your sovereignty. I
denounce your infamous tax on me and
every motion of my life. I cancel your tax on my soul. Where is your title?.../ denounce you
as traitors [his
emphasis]. It is treason to tear the country from its owners and conduct it as a
private plantation for your
bloated enrichment and their ruin."
4
Morrison I. Swift, "Striking Teamsters," April 9, April 15, April 16,
1907, University of Massachusetts-
Amherst, Microfilm Collection.
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Perhaps Swift's most interesting innovation in this particular crusade of the
jobless consisted of a march of 400 men, apparently including German, Polish, Greek,
and Yiddish-speaking Jewish immigrant workers, whom he led on Sunday, January 19
into Copley Square and then Trinity Church, the church of the city's Back Bay
bourgeoisie. Swift sent a note to the rector, Dr. Alexander Mann, that conveyed interest
in hearing him address the plight of the jobless. Mann, who had dedicated the day's
sermon to foreign missions (a detail Swift would have appreciated), decided to continue
his address. Yet, Mann dedicated his next sermon to Swift's issue and collected more
than a thousand dollars for relief. Unlike the 1894 campaign, however, Swift's organizing
and social demands in 1908 gained no traction with policymakers and lingered after
several more weeks of marches and minor arrests of Swift and others.
5
Furthermore, once
Governor Guild had investigated the "agitator" leading the demonstrations, he refused to
entertain more discussion with a man who "openly and publicly reviles all religion,
encourages unchastity in women, and advocates house-breaking and theft."
6
Despite Guild's interest in discrediting Swift before the city on a hill, his remarks
were not incorrect. Swift continued to write unsuccessful novels, and even published a
5
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did not vote in behalf ot the principles
which he says he believes." Furthermore, Guild indicated that Swift may
have no longer enjoyed support
from AFL officials as he seemed to have in 1894, since he was "not a
wage-earner, is ineligible for election
in any genuine labor union, and further that he is not recognized
as a leader of labor by labor leaders His
own admission shows that he is not unemployed, and that he needs
no relief in food, clothing or shelter.
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book of short stories. 7 But Swill dedicated the weight of his literary efforts to crafting
rather rambling and idiosyncratic critiques of American culture and polities. x Through
them he undeniably intended to both challenge and shock conservative American readers.
His libertarian socialist writings influenced a few thinkers, including Harvard philosopher
and fellow anti-imperialist William James, who cited in Pragmatism a long passage from
Swift's book Unman Submission and endorsed Swift's attack upon the amoral
abstractions and scholasticism of modern ethics. 9
Unfortunately, in his book Marriage and Race Death, Swift also utili/cd in a
rather awkward fashion the social Darwinist and eugenicist discourse of his day in order
to make anti-capitalist arguments against traditional marriage. He claimed that his
purpose in the book was to discover "the foundations of a rational conception of the
purpose of human life," but his theories of social development were not always entire
logical or rational.
10
Swift praised the slate for displacing the Church in supervising
marriages, bul he argued that marriage and reproduction under capitalism only further
degenerated the formerly sacred family, provided employers with surplus labor that
7
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reduced wages and intensified exploitation, and brought women and children into the
workplace. Swift trembled that "the time is near when population in civilized countries
will be maintained by the breeding of the rotten. They are unamenable to ordinary social
restraints. Physically and morally defective, forced to live beneath decency, they will
have little capacity of thought for the children they get, a large section of whom will be
illicit; while their families, where they exist, will retrogress into rudimental forms." Swift
reinforced the culturalist and racialist condescensions and fears of American middle-class
progressives, and the strategy he proposed for those "who would rescue the ideal
principle of sex union"-"they must attack the social structure fundamentally" and
struggle "for a social order in which the best can breed the race, and rear it in the best
manner"-was hardly pragmatic, if not outright reactionary."
Furthermore, Swift tended to reinforce traditional family structures and gendered
norms by decrying female and child employment (even though he blamed capitalism and
not individuals for this), endorsed working-class temperance, but from a radical and not
middle-class rationale ("Drinking men undermine their judgment and are untrustworthy
in a matter of such tremendous moment as revolutionary reconstruction . . . They may be
moved more easily, but they are worth much less when they are moved. The same is true
of sexual profligates"), and betrayed a culturally-specific misanthropy which erred on the
rhetorical ("The present American, British, French, German, and Russian races ought to
expire, to be supplanted by breeds of higher potentiality . . .The best thing
that can
happen for them and mankind is extinction.").
12
But Swift also reversed the racist social
biology of his day by praising African-Americans. Swift hoped that
blacks in the United
'
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States, whom he believed already had "the germs of traits loftier than the white man's." if
left to develop their own race without copying "the shoddy qualities of the white now
viling [sic] human life," would then "enrich us by interbreeding." 13 Swift also clearly
displayed anti-Semitism, although he qualified it with a somewhat stereotyped class
analysis of the Jewish immigrant community that later pervaded his anti-religious
writings in the 1920s.
14
But at least Swift matched his increasingly cranky scribblings with innovative (if
not a bit eccentric) policy proposals. In the Progressive era, even conservative
Massachusetts enjoyed a tide of progressive legislation. 15 But Swift's legislative fancies
must have alternately provoked and inspired Bostonians, depending on their political
views. In 1912, Swift submitted House Bill 564, "A School for Legislators and Judges."
The ignorance most legislators displayed regarding the everyday problems of their
constituents could be reduced, Swift suggested, if one year of education were mandated
between election and assumption of office. But the school Swift would have them attend
did not instruct the fine points of parliamentary procedure or the subtleties of public
oratory. Swift would require senators and representatives to live for one month in a
Boston slum tenement, pass two nights in cheap lodging houses, spend three consecutive
nights in the Hawkins Street Wayfarers' Lodge (the city's poor house), and stay five days
and nights in different state prisons, all "in order that he may begin to understand
practically the basis on which Massachusetts society, culture and wealth rest, to the end
13
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that he may intelligently legislate on the problems of wealth, poverty, capital, labor,
crime and disease." 16
On a more practical level. Swift also urged Massachusetts lawmakers to increase
educational opportunities for slate prisoners, legalize divorce by mutual agreement, ban
strikebreaking, and limit inheritances individuals could bestow to a maximum of
$1 ()(),()()(), with the rest going towards the state in order to "bring about the equality of
opportunity which is professed to be our national principle, and to set free the energies of
I
"7
the people whieh arc now chained into inaction by poverty." Swift certainly joined
many Massachusetts progressives who hoped to ameliorate the social and political
problems of in a society structured by an unfettered capitalist economy and a relatively
weak state. But Swift departed from these reformers not only in his socialist sensibilities.
I laving discarded his own former interest in settlement work. Swift rejected the moralism
and accusatory individualism of middle-class urban reformers, lie instead attempted to
pressure political and social authorities in Boston and Massachusetts into empowering
workers and the poor and recognizing social rights. And lie continued to lead more
demonstration of the unemployed, particularly in the sharp 1914 depression, before the
prosperity induced by military production for the Hnglish and their allies in World War I
generated widespread employment and a tight labor market.
But Swift was once more swimming against the tides of history. He failed to
recognize that the same elite culture that promoted expansion abroad also
sponsored
progressive elements interested in colonizing and reforming the alien cultures
of Boston's
16 Morrison 1. Swift, Prostitution A Remedy (Boston, 1912), 3
17
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largely immigrant working class and poor. The fact that Yankee elites like I lenry Cabot
Lodge hoped to use empire abroad to uplift and civilize foreign cultures while at the same
time supporting efforts to assimilate dangerous foreigners in Boston was not a
coincidence. As historian Charles S. Maier notes, empires are not merely phenomena that
exist outside of the metropole. They reorganize the "center" and the "periphery" at the
same time, always reproducing relationships of power to incorporate subordinate cultures
and their elite while reinforcing the power of the empire's most powerful rulers.
"Empire," Maier tells us, "is a form of political organization in which the social elements
that rule in the dominant state-the mother country or the metropole-create a network of
allied elites in regions abroad who accept subordination in international affairs in return
for the security of their position in their own administrative unit (the colony or the
periphery)." 19 In the process of empire, these subordinate elites secure an intermediary
position from which they negotiate for the subordinate population they represent.
In this sense, the trade union leaders and ethnic ward bosses who dominated the
immigrant majority within Boston's working class represented the leaders of a kind of
subordinate internal colony. And the very exclusive racial and cultural constructions
which Swift adopted in his later writings only reflected and reinforced the middle-class
moralism of urban settlement workers whom Swift seemed to oppose. Reformers like the
prodigious Robert A. Woods of Boston's South End literally hoped to -colonize" the
urban immigrant poor and working-class in order to fashion them into
models of
bourgeois American mores. Woods also realized that trade unions tended to be the
most
effective institutions for acculturation in the city,
constituting in effect what labor
19 Maier, Among Empires, 7
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historian James Barrett has called "Americanization from the bottom up."20 Certainly
Swift was a socialist who was unhappy with Boston's corrupt city politics and the
conservatism of mainstream AFL unions. But he failed to see that American empire not
only exported the exclusionary structures of cultural hierarchy and social inequality of the
domestic society abroad; empire actually reinforced domestic structures of oppression as
well. Swift understood this relationship in traditional republican terms-he worried that a
standing army required by an empire for monopoly capital would increase
authoritarianism and militarism at home-but he failed to understand the injurious
dialectic between a culture of empire abroad and a culture of empire at home.
By World War I, it certainly seemed that many American workers had
accommodated themselves, probably entirely unconsciously, to a kind of unreflective
imperial citizenship. While many socialists, anarchists, and even traditional isolationists
opposed U.S. military intervention in a war between European empire-states, certainly a
majority of American workers supported democratic American ideals invoked by
President Woodrow Wilson, supported American intervention, and supported the war
effort; many even accepted conscription. As numerous labor and political historians have
pointed out, AFL leaders feverishly supported the war effort. They joined labor
progressives like Frank Walsh in utilizing growing influence in the Democratic Party to
take advantage of national industrial mobilization and the corporatist
agencies of the
Wilson administration like the National War Labor Board, all in the hopes
of establishing
"industrial democracy" in America. And they were quite successful, winning
a host of
20 Green and Denote Boston 's Workers, 68; James R. Barrett, "Americanization
from the Bottom Up:
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reforms like the eight-hour day, federal arbitration of strikes and industrial disputes, and
government management of railroads. 21
Nevertheless, as the potential for a fully interventionist state and corporatist social
order waned in the years of reaction following the armistice, American workers and their
trade union leaders might have asked themselves whether the benefits of citizenship in an
empire were worth the consequences. Undeniably, American integration into world
markets and a stable and prosperous Europe ready to buy American goods and American
investments led to enormous profits in the 1920s, some of which trickled down to a small
percentage of American workers. But at what cost? American workers, previously loyal
to a republican vision of a virtuous and roughly egalitarian state without standing armies,
now had accepted conscription for a foreign war, not an immediate civil or domestic war.
They had tolerated the repression of labor radicals and socialist parties. And they had lost
the rather ephemeral social benefits wrought by Progressive policies during the Wilson
administration. Such patterns arguably laid the structures for the conservatism of the
post-World War II era, in which many American workers developed a robust "working-
class Americanism," accepted the trade-offs of relative affluence and security in a mass-
consumer society dominated and militarized by a welfare-warfare state, and faced a
nuclearized Cold War for capitalism against communism-all at the risk of being drafted
for "peripheral" wars in Korea and Vietnam.
22
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But not all working-class Americans accepted the benefits of empire, either before
or during World War I or in the decades that followed. 23 A militant minority of
organizers and activists carried on the internationalism pioneered by radicals like Swift at
the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, many of them, including and especially
members of the Communist Party, sometimes subordinated their anti-imperialism to a
politics of internationalism which refused to acknowledge the genuine and valuable
patriotism of many American workers. Perhaps if Morrison Swift had not been such a
terribly eccentric figure in the history of Progressive-era American radicalism, he could
have had greater influence on radical movements within the working class, and steered
working-class opponents of empire towards both invoking the republican traditions of the
American past, and a hope for an egalitarian social order in the future in an American
idiom. Indeed, according to his theory of monopoly capital and foreign policy. Swift's
ideal social system of "public ownership" necessarily abolished the key economic causes
of modern empire. But Swift, ever an idealist and humanitarian, could not be that figure,
as he himself succumbed to the Progressive call for an empire of democracy in World
War I.
In 1913 and 1914, Swift had helped left-leaning Lettish members of the
Massachusetts state Socialist Party capture that organization from moderate socialists.
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But when these moderates regained control of the state SP organization, Swift was one of
a handful of English-speaking Yankee socialists leading the Lettish-backed Socialist
Propaganda League, a proto-Communist and anti-militarist organization that contributed
to the founding of America's first Communist Party a few years later. 25 But despite his
previous antipathy for wars of empire, Swift clearly started to view the European war as a
war against German barbarism, and American involvement a lesser evil required to stop
an evil of far greater proportions. In May, 1915, following the sinking of the Lusitania by
a German submarine, Swift averred that world civilization itself was at risk. The United
States' neutrality could be justified only if the defeat of the Germans were assured, an
assurance Swift could not accept.
26
Two months later Swift warned that a victorious Germany would use its
supremacy on the seas to extend German power into the Western hemisphere. The only
threat less dangerous to the survival of the American republic, argued Swift, were the
"peace advocates." Military victory over Germany was the only possible assurance of an
end to militarism. In compromising with the Prussian empire, anti-war activists and
pacifists were "the chief promoters of undying war and lasting military reign," wrote
Swift. "They are giving possession of the world to the fighting Prussians and extending
the Hohenzollern throne all over the earth. The most potent enemies of peace and
perpetuators of war are these American peace preachers in this terrible crisis of
civilization."
27
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Almost three years later, and months after American military participation in the
war, Swift's support for the war had not dissipated at all; if anything, it increased. Swift,
now 62 years old, displayed a growing interest in the health of the "race'* which led him
to endorse universal military training. Universal and mandatory conscription of American
men ''would be a means of developing America health and preventing the formation of
soft habits of life, which had been steadily growing on the people before the war." To
protect civilization after the war had ended, Swift urged his fellow Americans, "men in
the democratic nations must be different from what they were before the war came. They
must be much more virile physically and much better trained to think. In this country we
• 28have learned that we were very lame in both respects."
The Swift of 1918 was far different than the Swift of 1899, who had scorned
Roosevelt for advocating the strenuous life and military adventurism as a means to
reclaiming lost American manhood. But Swift still looked forward to a revolutionary
reconstruction of western societies in the aftermath of World War I, and he endorsed the
Bolshevik revolution as a revolution of the "slaves" against "masters," a revolution which
exposed the Wilsonian war for democracy as a war that ultimately established the
supremacy of democratic capitalist societies over German autocracy, but still maintained
reactionary social inequality.
29
His cynicism regarding human institutions now confirmed
by the horrors of world war. Swift informed readers that only a revolution in social
values
would reorganize society in ways that would abolish war and social oppression.
The
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values of capitalism, the values of "living on others," would have to be transcended by
those willing to reorganize human societies on the basis of equality.
The first step toward this fundamental revolution in human values, argued Swift,
was for "these people who regard riches as life" to surrender their desire for wealth.
Ultimately, Swift reminded those surveying with him the wreckage of a destroyed Europe
and looking anxiously to the Russian revolution and the future, they would have to decide
between "selfishness and survival," in effect, between barbarism or socialism. "The earth
could be saved," Swift cried, "but it will not save itself nor will Nature do it; that work is
tor you.
30
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